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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
: Case No. 20081068 
APPELLEE/PETITIONER, 
v. 
SUSAN TRIPP, (not incarcerated) 
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT. 
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
Article VIII § of the Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) 
and (5) provide this Court's jurisdiction over the State's timely filed petition.1 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION 
1. Did the court of appeals apply the correct legal standard in assessing 
voluntariness of consent? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision without deference 
for correctness. See, e.g., Newman v. White Water Whirlpool. 2008 UT 79,1J6, 197 P.3d 
654. 
This issue was addressed in pages 10-13 of the State's petition for certiorari. 
1
 The court of appeals filed the Tripp opinion on October 30, 2008. This Court 
granted the State's motion to extend the time for filing its certiorari petition to December 
31, 2008. The State filed its petition on December 31, 2008. 
2. If necessary, should this Court affirm the court of appeals' consent analysis on 
the alternative bases that the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous and 
incomplete and legal conclusions were incorrect, and/or on the alternative basis that any 
consent was tainted by Tripp's illegal arrest? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision without deference 
for correctness. See, e ^ , Newman v. White Water Whirlpool 2008 UT 79, |^6, 197 P.3d 
654. 
Tripp raised the underlying arguments in the court of appeals. See, e.g.. Opening 
Brief of Appellant at 7-23, Reply Brief of Appellant at 1-10, On certiorari, this Court has 
full authority to affirm the court of appeals on alternative grounds. See, e.g.. State v. 
Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, If 18, 123 P.3d 407. 
3. Did the court of appeals err in assessing probable cause in addressing the State's 
argument that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision without deference 
for correctness. See, e ^ , Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79,1J6, 197 P.3d 
654. 
This issue was addressed in pages 13-15 of the State's petition for certiorari. 
4. Did the court of appeals err in its assessment of the State's inevitable discovery 
argument? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision without deference 
for correctness. See, e ^ , Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79, [^6, 197 P.3d 
654. 
This issue was addressed in pages 15-17 of the State's petition for certiorari. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Copies of the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution are in 
the addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Tripp with automobile homicide, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1), and with failure to yield the right of way, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-72.10(3) (R. 2-3). The 
magistrate presided over the preliminary hearing and ordered Tripp bound over as 
charged (R. 32-33). 
Tripp moved to suppress evidence, the State opposed the motion, and Tripp replied 
(R. 36-58; 65-125; 126-44). Judge Kennedy presided over an evidentiary hearing and 
heard oral argument before denying the motion to suppress (R. 157-62). 
Following the trial, the jury convicted Tripp as charged (R. 299). Judge Kennedy 
sentenced Tripp to concurrent terms of zero to five years in prison and ninety days in jail, 
but then suspended that sentence and required her to serve three hundred and sixty days in 
2 
jail as a condition of probation (R. 397-400, 403). 
Tripp filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 409). The court of appeals reversed the 
trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and remanded for a new trial or other 
proceedings. State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, 197 P.3d 99. 
The State petitioned for certiorari and Tripp opposed the petition. This Court 
granted the petition. 
RELEVANT FACTS2 
Tripp stopped at the stop sign on the Old Bingham Highway and was driving her 
truck across U-111 at the intersection, when a motorcycle driven by Daniel Pracht, which 
was headed south on U-111, slid underneath and into the rear end of her truck (R. 525: 
346).3 Pracht later died from his injuries sustained in the crash (R. 533: 9). The road 
Pracht was driving on is hilly, and dips three eights of a mile prior to the intersection (R. 
533: 59-60). The road configuration or Tripp's own doorpost could have blocked her 
view of Pracht's motorcycle as she entered the intersection (R. 533: 60). 
At the time of the collision, Pracht may have been speeding, and this may have 
2These facts include those about the circumstances of the accident and the potential 
causes thereof, as they pertain to the issue of probable cause underlying the exigent 
circumstances and inevitable discovery analysis. 
3The State's assertion that Tripp pulled out and collided with Pracht may 
inadvertently give the incorrect impression that she hit him with the front of her car. See 
State's brief at 4. 
3 
been the cause of the accident. As the trial court recognized, the State's evidence 
conflicted regarding whether he should have been driving fifty or sixty miles an hour (T. 
526: 563, 696, R; 527: 705, State's Exhibit 30). Tripp had the right to assume that Pracht 
was going the speed limit (R. 533: 60-61). The State's accident reconstructionist 
conceded that, due to a lack of underlying data from the police investigation, he would 
not purchase stock if his decision were based on information of the same quality as he had 
to work with in Tripp's case (R. 526: 516). Nonetheless, he estimated that Pracht was 
driving at least 59 miles an hour, and may have been going faster than that (R. 526: 505, 
514). He testified that if Pracht had been going fifty miles an hour, Tripp would have 
cleared the intersection before Pracht came through, and that there would have been no 
accident (R. 526:516). 
Pracht's braking error may have caused the accident. The point of impact between 
his motorcycle and the rear end of Tripp's truck appeared to be within three feet of either 
side of the center line on U-l 11, the road Pracht was driving on at the time of the crash 
(R. 526: 509). The physical evidence showed that prior to the collision, Pracht was 
applying only his rear brake (R. 526: 475), and that he skidded for some forty-four feet 
prior to sliding underneath and hitting Tripp's truck (R. 525: 355-56, 358, R. 526: 465). 
Applying only the rear brake on a motorcycle routinely causes them to lose control and 
slide (R. 526: 410, 415). Had Pracht been braking properly, he could have stopped or 
steered around Tripp's truck, rather than sliding underneath and colliding with it as he did 
4 
(R. 532: 37-39). 
The police were called immediately to the scene, at 6:53 p.m. (R. 526: 449). The 
police did not ask Tripp to perform field sobriety tests (R. 533: 25). Officer Saunders, 
who was trained to detect signs of impairment, testified at trial that he performed no field 
sobriety tests because he had no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was impaired, but sought 
a blood draw from her as a matter of course, as he does with people in all serious 
accidents (R. 525:350, 377).4 
4The State's brief notes that the victim's advocate, Budd, detected the odor of 
alcohol from the car Tripp was in prior to being moved to the police car, and then 
detected the odor of alcohol from Tripp's person when Tripp was in the police car. 
State's brief at 6. The State's brief alleges that Budd informed the police that she smelled 
the alcohol, without clarifying that Budd's testimony was that she informed the police of 
the odor in the family car Tripp and other adults were in (R. 533: 84). There is no 
testimony that she informed the police of the smell she detected coming from Tripp, no 
testimony that she informed the police of the odor from the family car at the scene or 
later. The State's brief also notes that the blood tech smelled an odor of alcohol from 
Tripp (his testimony was that the odor was slight R. 53: 97). There is no evidence that he 
detected the odor prior to drawing her blood, or that the police were informed of the odor. 
The State's brief alleges that Budd noticed that Tripp slurred her words. State's 
brief at 6, citing R 533: 84. This assertion is erroneous. Page 84 of the transcript reflects 
this testimony: 
Q Was she able to speak lucidly? 
A Yeah, she was speaking. 
Q I mean, she wasn't slurring her words? 
A I'm not familiar how she speaks but that day I spoke to her, yeah. 
(R. 533:84). 
Assuming arguendo that this testimony is fairly read as an indication that Tripp 
was slurring her speech, there is no evidence that Budd informed the police. In order to 
establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support Fourth Amendment intrusions 
by the police, the facts must be known to the police. See, e^g., United States v. Stewart, 
867 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1989)(considering facts known by the police in assessing 
lawfulness of search). Cf., e ^ , State v. Applegate. 2008 UT 63, f 17, 194 P.3d 925 
5 
The police officers who demanded and ordered that Tripp's blood be drawn 
believed that they had a right to do so in that absence of probable cause. Officer 
Saunders, who initially ordered Detective Roberts to obtain Tripp's blood, routinely took 
blood samples in cases involving serious accidents and believed that this was a lawful 
demand for him to make (R. 533: 10, 25, 55). At the time of the blood draw, Detective 
Roberts believed that he had the legal right to demand a blood sample from Tripp as a 
result of the implied consent statute (R. 532: 23, 533: 33-34). 
Tripp consented to undergo a urine test, but adamantly refused to submit to a blood 
test because she is phobic of needles (R. 533: 65). The police isolated her from her 
friends and family, informed her she was in custody and/or under arrest, and demanded 
that she submit to the blood test, telling her that they would get a warrant and take her 
blood by force if she did not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). 
Perhaps the best indicator of the illegal nature of the arrest is the testimony of 
Officer Monson, who frankly conceded that he did not know of a basis for Tripp's arrest 
(R. 525:350, 377; R. 533:73). 
The victim's advocate tried unsuccessfully to calm Tripp and assuage her fear of 
needles, and the blood tech also tried to calm her and paraphrased the DUI admonitions, 
mentioning her rights to silence, to counsel, and her right to refuse the test (R. 525: 268, 
R. 533: 102). 
(reasonableness of detention turns on objective analysis of facts known to the police). 
6 
During the blood draw, Tripp was in a police car with a police officer outside the 
car door and covering Tripp's eyes, a victim's advocate kneeling in front of her holding 
one of her hands, and the blood tech right outside the car door holding her other arm 
behind her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). While she did extend her arm to the blood tech 
prior to the test, this was in response to his telling her that he was going to put the 
tourniquet on and see if there was a spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533: 
95). The blood tech felt that Tripp did not know that he had his other equipment ready to 
draw her blood when she extended her arm (R. 533: 95). He testified that once he found 
a spot to draw the blood, he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can just 
go ahead and take care of this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring Tripp, he 
stuck the needle in (R. 533: 95). During the blood draw, Tripp was described as terrified, 
petrified, crying, and panicked (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). She was pulling away and crying as 
they secured her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 271). 
Tripp's blood, which was drawn at 9:25 (R. 525: 257), showed metabolite of 
cocaine and blood alcohol levels of .085 and .089 (R. 525: 305, 309, 319). There was no 
scientific means to assess when Tripp took the cocaine or whether the cocaine metabolite 
had any impairing effect on Tripp (R. 525: 306, 309). The equipment used to assess 
blood alcohol levels is only within six percent of accuracy ninety-six percent of the time 
(R. 525: 324). 
After denying Tripp's motion to suppress, the trial court admitted the test result on 
7 
the theory that Tripp's blood draw was voluntary and consensual (R. 157-60). The trial 
court instructed the jury that Pracht's negligence could not be considered as a superseding 
cause (R. 336). 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to 
suppress, holding that the blood draw was not consensual. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, fflf 
14-17. The court found that the blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances, 
given the absence of probable cause. Id. at ^[ 18-22. The court also found that the blood 
draw was not exempted from the exclusionary rule by the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
because the lack of probable cause did not support the necessary showing that a warrant 
would inevitably have issued. Id. at ^f 23-25. Because the court found the blood draw 
involuntary, it saw no need to address Tripp's claim that the blood draw was also tainted 
by her illegal arrest. Id. at f^ 15. The court did not address Tripp's claims that the trial 
court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and incomplete, and conclusions of law 
were incorrect. The court of appeals did not address the merits of Tripp's contention that 
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the law of superceding cause. Id. at Tf 
12n.5. 
8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Tripp decision does not elevate the government's burden of proof of consent, 
or advocate a presumption against consent. Standard Fourth Amendment law requires the 
government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was unequivocal and freely given." The Tripp decision correctly applied 
the law to the evidence, which indicates that the warrantless blood draw was coerced, and 
was legally involuntary. 
In the event it is necessary to do so, this Court may affirm the conclusion that the 
government did not prove consent on the alternative bases of arguments raised by Tripp 
in the court of appeals. The trial court's clearly erroneous findings of fact and incorrect 
legal conclusions, and/or the taint of Tripp's illegal arrest on any purported consent, 
would independently or jointly support a conclusion that there was no legal consent to the 
blood draw. 
The court of appeals properly assessed the evidence showing the absence of 
probable cause to justify a blood draw. Given the absence of probable cause, the court of 
appeals correctly ruled that the warrantless blood draw was not sustainable under the 
exigent circumstance doctrine. The court similarly correctly recognized that the absence 
of probable cause defeated an argument under the inevitable discovery doctrine, because 
in the absence of probable cause, no warrant inevitably would have been obtained by the 
police. The court's inevitable discovery analysis was correct. 
9 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' ANALYSIS OF CONSENT 
WAS CORRECT. 
A. The Court of Appeals' Legal Standard Was Correct. 
The State argues that in assessing the voluntariness of consent, the court of appeals 
applied the incorrect Ham/Villano test,5 which test was overruled in State v. Hansen, 
2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 and United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1991). 
State's brief at 13-16. The Ham test had three prongs: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, 
express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] 
indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived. 
State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citations omitted), abrogated. State 
v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, rejected. State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 
1073. The Villano test was essentially the same.6 
5See State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citations omitted), 
abrogated. State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, rejected. State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 
99, 37 P.3d 1073, and Villano v. United States. 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962), 
abrogated United States v. Price. 925 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1991). 
6The Villano test was: 
"The government must prove that consent was given. It must show that 
there was no duress or coercion, express or implied. The consent must be 
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given.' There must 
be convincing evidence that defendant has waived his rights.... ' Courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental 
10 
In Hansen, this Court disapproved of the use of the word "intelligently" in the first 
prong of the Ham test, because it implied that the prosecution had the burden to prove 
that the person knew of the right to refuse consent. This is not an essential element of 
proof for the State, but is merely one factor courts may consider. See Hansen. 2002 UT 
125, Tf 54. The Hansen Court rejected the third prong of the Ham test, because there are 
no presumptions against waivers of Fourth Amendment rights. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, f^ 
55. Similarly, in Price, in overruling Villano. the Tenth Circuit held that the presumption 
against waiver would no longer apply in light of the Supreme Court's guidance in 
Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 (1973), that such presumptions are not 
appropriate in the Fourth Amendment context. Price. 925 F.2d at 1271. Just as this 
Court's Hansen decision limited only part of the Ham analysis, in Price, the court 
expressly indicated that the entire Tenth Circuit was in agreement that the remaining 
Villano analysis was still relevant in the voluntariness of consent inquiry. Id. at 1271 and 
n.3. 
The language in Tripp to which the State objects, which requires the State to prove 
"clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given," is the 
same essential test applied by the Tenth Circuit repeatedly since Price. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Butler. 966 F.2d 559, 562 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. McNeelv. 6 F.3d 
constitutional rights." 
310F.2dat684. 
11 
1447, 1453 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Winningham. 120 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Zubia-Melendez. 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Guerrero. 472 F.3d 784, 789 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Lyons. 510 F.3d 
1225, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007). It is also the same language applied by state courts in post-
Schneckcloth opinions. See, e.g., State v. Thompson. 166 P.3d 1015, 776 (Kan. 2007); 
and State v. Harris. 642 A.2d 1242, 1247 n.8 (Del. Super. 1993). 
The State argues as if the Tripp opinion's language which requires the State to 
prove "clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given" 
incorrectly elevates the State's burden from a preponderance to a clear and convincing 
standard of proof. State's brief at 15. The case upon which the argument relies, A.C. 
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co.. 960 F.2d 1020, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(en banc), is a patent suit involving issues of laches and estoppel. In its discussion of 
quantum of proof, the court distinguished between the preponderance of the evidence 
standard and the clear and convincing standard. The latter standard applies in cases 
where there is a danger of deception, where there is an "important individual interest" at 
stake, where a claim is disfavored as a matter of policy, and in certain patent cases. Id. at 
1045. In discussing how both standards of proof are at times applied in estoppel cases by 
various courts, the court explained that confusion about the applicable standard likely was 
attributable to the courts' failure to distinguish between the quantum of proof required 
and the substance of the evidence to be proved by that standard - the facts underlying the 
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estoppel claim. As the court explained, 
[T]he disagreement over the appropriate standard may be more apparent 
than real, "because of the failure to distinguish between the quantum or 
weight of the evidence and the substance or implication of the evidence 
required to establish an equitable estoppel; that is to say, while the facts 
relied upon to establish an equitable estoppel must be clear, positive, and 
unequivocal in their implication, these facts need not be established by any 
more than a fair preponderance of the evidence." 
Aukerman, at 1045-46, quoting 28 Am Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver, § 148, 830-31 
(1966). 
The State's concern regarding the Tripp court's purported elevation of its burden 
of proof beyond a preponderance is resolved by distinguishing between the quantum of 
proof required, preponderance of the evidence, and the substance of the evidence to be 
shown by that standard - clear, positive and unequivocal evidence of consent. See, e.g.. 
United States v. Arrington, 2008 WL 4459378 at * 3 ("The Government must show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was unequivocal, specifically and 
intentionally given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion."); United States v. 
Romero. 247 Fed. Appx. 955 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The government bears the burden of 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that unequivocal and specific consent was 
obtained.").7 
7Copies of these unpublished decisions are in the addendum. The vast majority of 
published cases are like Tripp, in identifying the proof the government must show 
regarding consent, without specifically identifying the preponderance standard. ISee e.g., 
cases cited on pages 12-13 of this brief, supra. 
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Contrary to the State's contentions, the court of appeals did not apply the portions 
of the Ham/Villano test which were rejected in Hansen and Price, but instead applied the 
Hansen test, while mentioning the valid portions of the Ham/Villano test which are 
consistent with portions of Hansen. The court of appeals explained, 
We start with consideration of whether Tripp consented voluntarily 
to the blood draw. "[C]onsent which is not voluntarily given is invalid." 
The appropriate standard to determine whether consent is voluntary "is the 
totality of the circumstances test." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ f 56, 63 
P.3d 650. "Under the totality of the circumstances test, a court should 
carefully scrutinize both the details of the detention, and the characteristics 
of the defendant." Id. "Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as 'the 
product of duress or coercion, express or implied.' " '[W]e further look to 
see if there is clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal 
and freely given.' "Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 293 (citation omitted). In other 
words, a person's will cannot be overborne, nor may his 'capacity for self-
determination [be] critically impaired.' " Hansen, 2002 UT 125, Tj 57, 63 
P.3d 650 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The State, of course, has 
the burden of establishing that consent was validly given. 
Tripp, 2008 UT App 388 Tf 14 (citations omitted). Particularly when it is read in context, 
where it is tied directly to Hansen, the Tripp court's reference to "clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given" is not reasonably read as 
applying a presumption against waiver. The opinion does not elevate the State's burden 
of proof above the preponderance of the evidence standard. Rather, Tripp's analysis is 
consistent with standard Fourth Amendment jurisprudence discussed above. 
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B. The Court of Appeals' Correctly Concluded that the State 
Failed to Prove Voluntary Consent. 
The State contends that the court of appeals should not have found that the 
purported consent was obtained by trickery, because the evidence supported the trial 
court's finding 15 that Tripp voluntarily extended her arm when the blood tech asked if 
she would consent to the blood draw. State's brief at 16-17. 
The court of appeals' factual analysis as to trickery is correct. When asked if 
Tripp consented to the blood draw, the blood tech testified that Tripp extended her arm to 
him prior to the test in response to his telling her that he was going to put the tourniquet 
on and see if there was a spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533: 94-95). The 
blood tech felt at that time that Tripp did not know that he had his other equipment ready 
to draw her blood when she extended her arm (R. 533: 95). He testified that once he 
found a spot to draw the blood, he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can 
just go ahead and take care of this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring 
Tripp, he stuck the needle in (R. 533: 95). In contrast, the trial court's finding 15 is 
clearly erroneous in reflecting that Tripp extended her arm to the blood tech in response 
to his asking if she would consent to the blood draw, and there is no evidence to marshal 
in support of this finding.8 
8In the court of appeals, Tripp challenged the trial court's finding to that effect as 
being clearly erroneous, because there is no evidence to support it. The State never 
contested the argument by identifying one scintilla of evidence to support the finding. 
See State's brief in the court of appeals at 12 n.3 (acknowledging Tripp's challenge and 
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The State contends that the Tripp opinion suggests that Tripp tried to pull her arm 
away to prevent the blood from being taken. The State posits that the court of appeals 
instead should have affirmed the trial court's finding that Tripp "never tried to withdraw 
her arm and ... never said ;no' or 'stop.'" State's brief at 17. 
The Tripp opinion does not suggest that Tripp tried to pull her arm away, but 
instead indicates: 
The State contends that Tripp's failure to immediately withdraw her 
arm must be taken as a clear indication of her consent. We cannot agree. 
During the blood draw, Tripp was surrounded by people working for the 
State-she was in a police car with an officer outside the door covering her 
eyes, a victims' advocate kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands, 
and the blood technician outside the car holding her arm where she could 
not see it. All the while Tripp was, according to the witnesses, terrified, 
crying, and panicked. Given the context of the threat of a forced blood 
draw, her arrest by the police, and the presence and participation of the 
State's many actors during the blood draw, we cannot say that Tripp 
voluntarily consented to have her blood drawn simply because she failed to 
retract her arm in the instant between when Davis said "we can go ahead 
and [take] care of this"-an ambiguous comment as concerns the timing of 
the intended blood draw in any event-and when he inserted the needle. 
Indeed, Officer Monson, the officer who witnessed the draw, testified that 
although Tripp initially offered her arm to Davis, "[s]he was pulling away," 
and "[s]he was crying. I tried to shield her eyes so [she] wouldn't look at the 
needle." The State argues that this is a natural response from someone who 
fears needles. We think, however, that given the context of her continuous 
refusals to submit to a blood draw, her expressed fear of needles, her arrest, 
the threat that she would be forced to provide the blood as soon as a warrant 
was obtained, and her crying and pulling away during the blood draw, the 
State has failed to meet its burden and to demonstrate that Tripp voluntarily 
gave consent under the totality of the circumstances. 
indicating it will address them in its discussion of the blood draw) and passim (failing to 
identify any evidence which supports the finding). 
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Id. at If 17. 
The trial court's finding that Tripp "never tried to withdraw her arm and ... never 
said 'no' or 'stop'" is only partially supportable by the evidence from the blood tech that 
to his recollection she did not ask him to stop during the draw (R. 533: 95).9 The finding 
is incomplete in failing to account for the State's witnesses' testimony that during the 
blood draw, Tripp was terrified, petrified, crying, panicked and pulling away as they 
secured her (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). The finding is incomplete in failing to account for the 
blood tech's testimony that he could not remember if she said to stop during the blood 
draw, but that she was definitely panicked and upset about it (R. 533: 67, 95). Indeed, in 
the court of appeals, the State's own brief acknowledged that Tripp was pulling away 
during the blood draw. State's brief in the court of appeals at 20. 
The State's argues that the court of appeals suggested in paragraph 17, supra, that 
Tripp's consent came in response to the police threat to obtain a warrant, despite the 
evidence purportedly establishing that the police officer's indication that he would get a 
warrant was not a means used to obtain Tripp's consent. State's brief at 17. The "threat 
of a forced blood draw" was one fact in the totality of circumstances upon which the court 
of appeals relied in rejecting the State's claim that Tripp's failure to withdraw her arm 
established voluntary consent. Tripp at ^ 17, supra. The evidence squares with the court 
9The marshaling requirement would be futile if applied to incomplete findings, and 
thus does not apply when findings are incomplete. See Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 
474, 477-478 (Utah App. 1991). 
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of appeals' presentation of the facts, in demonstrating that the police isolated Tripp from 
her friends and family, informed her she was in custody, and demanded that she submit to 
the blood test, telling her that they would get a warrant and take her blood by force if she 
did not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). The State's argument that the 
threat to obtain a warrant was not a "means used to obtain consent" is apparently a 
reference to Tripp's failure to immediately agree to a blood draw upon hearing this threat. 
The threat, however, was then followed by the police placing her under arrest and in the 
police car, and surrounding her with an officer outside the car door and covering Tripp's 
eyes, a victim's advocate kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands, and the blood 
tech right outside the car door holding her other arm behind her as he took her blood 
without her permission after leading her to believe that he was only checking for a good 
vein (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). The court of appeals properly considered the threat to 
obtain a warrant in its totality of the circumstances analysis of whether the blood draw 
was the product of coercion or consent. See Hansen, supra. 
The State complains of the court of appeals' failure to rely on the fact that the 
blood technician reviewed the DUI admonition, and mentioned Tripp's rights to silence, 
counsel and to refuse the test prior to the blood draw (R. 533: 102). State's brief at 17-18. 
Appellate courts are not required to detail in writing each fact considered by the 
courts prior to the issuance of any opinion. See, e.g.. State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 
(Utah 1992). Particularly in the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, facts are not to 
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be considered in isolation, but are to be considered in their totality. Cf., ej*., United 
States v. Arvisu, 534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002) (in assessing totality of circumstances 
supporting reasonable suspicion, courts should not "divide and conquer" each individual 
fact in isolation, but should assess the inferences to be drawn by considering the facts as a 
whole). 
The blood tech's discussion undoubtedly rang rather hollow to Tripp, and did 
nothing to contribute to a finding of voluntary consent, given that it came from a blood 
tech and occurred after the police had already informed Tripp that she was in custody, not 
free to leave, and under arrest (R. 532: 27; R. 533: 16, 31-32, 73). The legal advice, 
coming from a blood tech after the police demanded that she take the test, asserted that 
she could not refuse to submit to the blood draw, and threatened to get a warrant and take 
her blood by force if she did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72), had no 
legal effect in the circumstances of this case. The advice was then followed by the blood 
draw, which occurred when Tripp was being touched and restrained in a police car by a 
police officer and two other state actors, who took her blood without her permission as 
she was crying, panicked and pulling away (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). The advice of the 
blood tech did nothing to establish that the blood draw was voluntary or consensual. See, 
e.g., Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973) ("Conversely, if under all the 
circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily-that it was 
coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful 
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authority-then we have found the consent invalid and the search unreasonable. "). 
As is detailed further herein, the State did not and could not meet its burden to 
prove voluntary consent. Because the court of appeals' legal standard is correct, and was 
properly applied to the facts of Tripp's case, this Court should affirm the Tripp decision. 
IL IF NECESSARY, THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE 
COURT OF APPEALS' CONSENT ANALYSIS ON 
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS. 
On certiorari, this Court has full authority to affirm the court of appeals on 
alternative grounds. See, e.g., State v. Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, ^  18, 123 P.3d 407. The trial 
court's clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law, and the taint of the 
unlawful arrest of Tripp on any purported consent provide ample alternative bases for 
affirmance. 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion to Suppress Was 
Clearly Erroneous and Legally Incorrect. 
1. The Findings of Fact Were Clearly Erroneous 
and Materially Incomplete.10 
The trial court's findings on the motion to suppress now follow, with emphasis 
10The marshaling requirement would be futile if applied to incomplete findings, 
and thus does not apply when findings are incomplete. See Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 
P.2d 474, 477-478 (Utah App. 1991). 
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added to those findings that were challenged on appeal. The challenges follow the 
quotation of the court's findings. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant was involved in an auto-motorcycle accident, which resulted in 
the death of Daniel Pracht. 
2. The defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test and stated that 
officers could test her blood if they did not use a needle. 
3. The defendant's initial refusal to take a blood test was based solely on 
her fear of needles. 
4. When speaking with Officer Saunders, the defendant denied using 
alcohol or drugs and expressed her fear of needles. 
5. Detective Roberts talked with the defendant multiple times. The more he 
spoke with the victim, the more concerned he became that she was impaired 
by something. 
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the 
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared 
to lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily. 
7. No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they 
observe any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred 
speech. 
8. The victim advocate, Cecilia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the 
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car. 
9. The defendant was eventually placed in Detective Roberts un-marked 
vehicle and secluded from her family and friends because they were 
interfering with the investigation. 
10. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was seated in Detective 
Roberts' unmarked vehicle. The defendant was seated halfway in the 
vehicle, with the door open and her legs outside the vehicle. 
11. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was not handcuffed or 
shackled. 
12. At the time of the blood draw, Mr. Davis and Cecilia Budd were 
present, and neither was in uniform or armed. Officer Monson was also 
nearby, but he was not in uniform. 
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13. Mr. Davis, the blood technician, spoke to the defendant about a blood 
draw and Mr. Davis could detect an odor of alcohol from the defendant. 
14. Mr. Davis reviewed with the defendant her right to remain silent, her 
right to counsel and her right to refuse the test. 
15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the 
defendant voluntarily extended her arm. 
16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tried to 
withdraw her arm and she never said "no" or "stop." 
17. When the blood draw was over, the defendant was immediately calm 
and stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be. 
(R. 157-159)(emphasis added). 
The trial court's findings are incomplete in failing to acknowledge from the outset 
that Officer Saunders, who initially ordered Detective Roberts to obtain Tripp's blood, 
routinely took blood samples in cases involving serious accidents and believed that this 
was a lawful demand for him to make (R. 533: 10, 25, 55), and that at the time of the 
blood draw, Detective Roberts believed that he had the legal right to demand a blood 
sample from Tripp as a result of the implied consent statute (R. 532: 23, 533: 33-34).The 
police officers' mis-perception that they were not required to obtain Tripp's consent or a 
warrant, and the fact that the officers made no effort to obtain a warrant, are clearly 
relevant to the assessment of the legality of the blood draw. See State v. Rodriguez, 2007 
UT 15, fflj 53-54, 156 P.3d 711 (recognizing relevance of, and expressing dismay 
concerning, officer's failure to know that a warrant should be obtained prior to a blood 
draw). 
Tripp does not contest the factual accuracy of the trial court's sixth factual finding, 
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that "Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the 
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared to lack 
concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily." He testified that her appearance 
when he approached her was "unusual" because her eyes were red, because she was 
shaking, and because she seemed nervous (R. 533: 11). He later testified that the more he 
talked with Tripp, the more he became concerned that she was impaired because she 
appeared to lack concern for Daniel Pracht, because the redness in her eyes was not 
dissipating, and because she was constantly smoking (R. 533: 14). 
However, the finding is incomplete because it does not account for Detective 
Roberts' acknowledgment that shakiness and nervousness would be normal for someone 
involved in a fatal car accident (R. 533: 27), the testimony of the State's own witnesses 
that Tripp was very upset by the accident and continued crying up to and throughout the 
blood draw (R. 532: 44, 48, R. 533: 67, 77, 82) and that her red eyes were caused by her 
crying (R. 533: 70, 77), and the testimony of the victim's advocate that Tripp was 
smoking that night in an effort to calm herself (R. 533: 77). 
Finding 8 is clearly erroneous in indicating that the victim advocate detected an 
odor of alcohol on Tripp when Tripp was in a family car, and there is no evidence to 
marshal in support of it. The victim advocate testified that she thought the odor of 
alcohol in the family car came from Tripp, but did not know Tripp smelled of alcohol 
until Tripp was under arrest and in Detective Roberts' police car, and then did not know if 
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the smell came from Tripp's clothing or her mouth (R. 525: 221, 224, R. 533: 76, 78, 86-
87).11 
Finding 9 is correct in noting that Tripps' family and friends were interfering with 
the police investigation, because police testimony reflects that they were telling Tripp she 
did not have to submit to a blood draw, and were walking through the accident site (R. 
533: 73-74). However, the finding is incomplete in failing to recognize that Tripp was 
not just moved to the police car, but was told she was in custody, not free to leave and 
was arrested at that juncture after she adamantly refused to submit to the blood test (R. 
532: 27; R. 533: 16, 31-32, 73). These facts are key to the issue of the lawfulness of her 
arrest and the subsequent blood draw, particularly in light of the testimony of Officer 
Saunders that there was no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was impaired, and the 
testimony of Officer Monson that he did not know of a basis for Tripp's arrest (R. 525: 
350, 377; R. 533:73). 
Findings 11 and 12 are accurate in indicating that Tripp was not handcuffed or 
shackled, that the blood tech and the victim advocate were present, that Officer Monson 
was nearby, and that none of these people was in uniform (e.g. R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). 
However, the findings are incomplete in failing to recognize that these people were 
nIn the court of appeals, the State did not contest the clearly erroneous nature of 
the trial court's finding of fact 8. Compare Tripp's opening brief at 8-13 with State's 
brief at 12 n.3 (acknowledging Tripp's challenges and indicating it will address them in 
its discussion of the blood draw) and passim (failing to identify any evidence which 
supports the findings). 
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physically restraining Tripp during the blood draw. During the blood draw, Officer 
Monson was outside the car door and covering Tripp's eyes, while the victim's advocate 
was kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands, and the blood tech was right 
outside the car door holding her other arm behind her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). She was 
pulling away and crying as they secured her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 271). 
Finding 14 is accurate in reflecting that the blood tech reviewed with Tripp her 
right to remain silent, her right to counsel, and her right to review the test, because he did 
testify that he went over the DUI admonition discussing these rights (R. 533: 102). 
However, the finding is incomplete in failing to recognize that this discussion occurred 
after the police informed Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest 
(R. 532: 27; R. 533: 16, 31-32, 73). The finding is incomplete in failing to account for 
police testimony that prior to the blood tech's discussion of the DUI admonition, the 
police demanded that she take the test and told her that she could not refuse to submit to 
the blood draw, and that the police would get a warrant and take her blood by force if she 
did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). 
Finding 15 is clearly erroneous in reflecting that Tripp extended her arm to the 
blood tech in response to his asking if she would consent to the blood draw, and there is 
no evidence to marshal in support of this finding. When asked if Tripp consented to the 
blood draw, the blood tech testified that Tripp extended her arm to him prior to the test in 
response to his telling her that he was going to put the tourniquet on and see if there was a 
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spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533: 94-95). The blood tech felt at that 
time that Tripp did not know that he had his other equipment ready to draw her blood 
when she extended her arm (R. 533: 95). He testified that once he found a spot to draw 
the blood, he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can just go ahead and 
take care of this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring Tripp, he stuck the 
needle in (R. 533: 95).12 
Finding 16 indicates that during the blood draw, Tripp never tried to withdraw her 
arm and never said "no" or "stop." The finding is supported by the evidence from the 
blood tech that she did not ask him to stop during the draw (R. 533: 95). However, it is 
incomplete in failing to account for the State's witnesses' testimony that during the blood 
draw, Tripp was terrified, petrified, crying, panicked and pulling away as they secured her 
(R. 533: 67, 71, 95). The finding is incomplete in failing to account for the blood tech's 
testimony that he* could not remember if she said to stop during the blood draw, but that 
she was definitely panicked and upset about it (R. 533: 67, 95). 
2. The Trial Court's Legal Conclusions Were 
Incorrect and Materially Incomplete. 
12In the court of appeals, the State did not contest the clearly erroneous nature of 
the trial court's finding of fact 15. Compare Tripp's opening brief at 8-13 with State's 
brief at 12 n.3 (acknowledging Tripp's challenges and indicating it will address them in 
its discussion of the blood draw) and passim (failing to identify any evidence which 
supports the findings). 
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The trial court made the following three conclusions of law: 
1. The defendant's initial refusal was based solely on her fear of needles, 
and the evidence demonstrates that at the time of the blood draw the 
defendant's fear was resolved. 
2. The defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw. 
3. The evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw is admissible. 
(R. 157-160). 
To the extent that the conclusions encompass factual findings, they are clearly 
erroneous, because there is no evidence that Tripp's fear of needles was resolved at the 
time of the blood draw, or that she voluntarily consented to the blood draw. Rather, the 
evidence demonstrates that during the blood draw, Tripp was terrified, petrified, crying, 
panicked and pulling away as the blood tech, victim's advocate and police officer secured 
her (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). There is no evidence that Tripp ever gave consent to the draw. 
Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the blood draw followed the police officers' 
telling Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest (R. 532: 27; R. 
533: 16, 31-32, 73), demanding that she take the test, and instructing her that she could 
not refuse to submit to the blood draw, and that the police would get a warrant and take 
her blood by force if she did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72).13 
13In the court of appeals, the State did not contest the clearly erroneous nature of 
the trial court's finding of fact encompassed in its conclusions of law. Compare Tripp's 
opening brief at 8-13 with State's brief at 12 n.3 (acknowledging Tripp's challenges and 
indicating it will address them in its discussion of the blood draw) and passim (failing to 
identify any evidence which supports the findings). 
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As the following discussion of law demonstrates, a person's submission to 
government threats and physical force does not amount to consent as a matter of law, 
particularly when any purported consent follows an illegal arrest. 
B. The Illegal Arrest Tainted Any Purported Consent. 
JL The Arrest and Blood Draw Were Unsupported by Probable Cause. 
"The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 'right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.'" United States v. Stone. 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989). 
Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution provides protection which is at least co-
extensive with that of the federal counterpart, in forbidding "sweeping, dragnet-type 
detentions of ordinary people engaged in peaceful, ordinary activities. Under both 
constitutions, the general rule is that "specific and articulable facts — taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, [must] reasonably warrant the particular intrusion." 
State v. DeBoov, 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000). See also id. 996 P.2d at 552 
(recognizing that Article I § 14 and numerous provisions of the Utah Declaration of 
Rights, consistent with the history of the founders of this State, are concerned with "all 
purpose criminal investigation without individualized suspicion."). 
In order to justify a warrantless arrest, the government must establish probable 
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cause. See, e ^ , State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, fflf 34-36, 63 P.3d 650 (police must have 
probable cause to arrest); United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 901 (10th Cir. 
2004)(government must prove probable cause to justify arrest). Probable cause is 
established if the facts known to the officer and the fair inferences from those facts would 
lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the suspect had committed a crime. 
State v Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983). Similarly, in order to justify the warrantless 
search involved in the blood draw, the government must establish, inter alia, a clear 
indication that evidence would be found in the blood draw. See, e.g.. State v. Alvarez, 
2005 UT App 145, U 16, 111 P.3d 808 (to justify a warrantless blood draw or other 
government search, the government must prove by at least a preponderance of the 
evidence "'(A) "a clear indication that evidence would be found"; (B) "exigent 
circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily intrusion"; and (C) "that the method 
chosen was a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner.'") (citation omitted). 
In the instant matter, the police had no probable cause, but instead arrested Tripp 
after she adamantly refused to submit to a blood draw (R. 533: 16, 31-32). They did this 
while acting under the incorrect belief that blood draws are routinely taken in serious 
accidents (R. 533: 10, 25), and that the police had the legal right to demand a blood 
sample from Tripp as a result of the implied consent statute (R. 532: 23, 533: 33-34). 
Officer Saunders conceded that he had no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was 
impaired or intoxicated, and testified that he sought a blood draw because the accident 
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was serious, and he routinely seeks blood draws in such cases and believed he could make 
the demand (R. 525: 350, 377). Tripp exhibited no signs of intoxication or impairment 
(e.g. R. 525: 387). See Trial Court's finding 7 ("No officer detected the odor of alcohol 
on the defendant, nor did they observe any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor 
balance or slurred speech."). Her red eyes, crying, smoking and nervousness were all 
consistent with the facts that she had just been involved in a fatal traffic accident and had 
been informed by the police that she had just killed a man and could not refuse their 
demand that she submit to a blood draw, which they would force if necessary, despite her 
profound fear of needles (e.g. R. 533: 11, 27, 121, 133). Her prolonged crying refutes the 
notion that she did not feel bad about the accident ( e ^ R. 532: 14, R. 525: 225, 229). 
The fact that she was willing to submit to urinalysis counters the notion that her refusal to 
submit to the blood test indicated intoxication (R. 532: 14). 
At the time of the arrest and blood draw, the police did not know if Pracht had 
been speeding when he ran into the back of Tripp's truck - Detective Roberts conceded 
that Pracht may have been going ninety miles an hour (R. 525: 373, R. 532: 32-35). From 
Pracht's skid marks, it appeared that he had braked improperly, in a manner known to 
cause the sliding which preceded his collision with Tripp's truck (R. 532: 17, 37). It 
appeared from the evidence at the scene that had he not done this, there was ample room 
for him to steer around Tripp's truck in the intersection or to stop before colliding with 
the truck (R. 532:37, 58-59). 
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Perhaps the best indicator of the illegal nature of the arrest is the testimony of 
Officer Monson, who frankly conceded that he did not know of a basis for Tripp's arrest 
(R. 525: 350, 377; R. 533:73). 
The foregoing facts of this case did not establish probable cause to justify Tripp's 
arrest, and failed to establish a clear indication that evidence would be found to justify the 
blood draw. Compare State v. Worwood. 2007 UT 47, fflj 26-36, 164 P.3d 397 (Court 
found reasonable suspicion but no probable cause that Worwood was driving under the 
influence, given his odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes, and proximity to 
crushed beer can, cooler, and large water spot on the road, because his walking and 
balance were steady); State v. Rodriguez. 2007 UT 15, fflf 3, 57, 59, 156 P.3d 711 (police 
had probable cause to justify a warrantless blood draw, where driver made an abrupt left 
turn in front of an oncoming school bus, accident was likely to be fatal, defendant had 
bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, and vodka bottle was found at the scene of the 
accident); and People v. Roybal 655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982) (odor of alcohol emanating 
from defendant and collision did not give rise to probable cause, absent evidence that 
defendant was responsible for collision). 
Because there was no probable cause to justify Tripp's arrest, the arrest violated 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I §14, and suppression of all evidence flowing 
therefrom is required. See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 484-488 (1963) 
(Fourth Amendment violations require suppression). Suppression is also a necessary 
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consequence of the violation of Article I § 14. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-71 
(Utah I990)(plurality).u Because there was no justification for the blood draw, see, 
e.g., Alvarez, supra, the blood test results are independently subject to suppression under 
Wong Sun and Larocco, supra. 
2. Particularly Because the Unlawful Arrest Tainted the Blood 
Draw, the Warrantless Blood Draw Cannot be Justified on the 
Theory of Consent. 
The blood draw constituted a search under federal and therefore state 
constitutional law. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966), 
Larocco, supra. Because there was no warrant, the government bears the burden to 
justify the search. See, e^, State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1993 (Utah App. 1991) 
(government bears burden to justify warrantless search). In order to justify the 
warrantless search of Tripp on the theory of consent, the government must show that the 
purported consent was voluntary, and was not the product of the unlawful arrest. E.g., 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993). 
14While Larocco is a plurality opinion, it is routinely applied as governing law in 
this state. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-20 (Utah 1991) (majority of the 
Court recognized privacy interest in bank records under Article I § 14, held in accordance 
with Larocco that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a violation of Article I § 14, 
and that no exceptions had been recognized to the Utah exclusionary rule); State v. 
DeBoov, 996 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah 2000) (finding exclusion of illegal checkpoint stop to 
be a necessary consequence of Article I § 14); State v. Ziegelman, 905 P.2d 883, 887 
(Utah App. 1995) (finding that violation of Fourth Amendment during traffic stop 
required suppression under Larocco). 
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Utah law consistently recognizes that where purported consent follows an 
illegality, the government's burden is substantial. Two factors determine whether consent 
to a search is lawfully obtained following police action that violates the Fourth 
Amendment, such as the unlawful arrest here: (1) the consent must be voluntary in fact; 
and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. 
E.g., Thurman, supra. Both tests must be met in order for evidence obtained in searches 
following police illegality to be admissible. Id. 
Subsection B of Point I of this brief demonstrates that the court of appeals 
correctly held that the blood draw was not consensual. See id- See also Florida v. Rover, 
460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)(plurality)("[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the 
State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was 
freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission 
to a claim of lawful authority."); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)(M Where 
there is coercion there cannot be consent."); State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106-107 
(Utah 1980), supra. Cf. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986) (contrasting 
Bumper and stating, "Nor was defendant's consent mere acquiescence to perceived police 
authority."). 
The government bears a particularly heavy burden in seeking to establish consent 
following a preceding illegality. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). In 
assessing the government's proof on this issue, the Court should consider "the totality of 
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the circumstances surrounding the defendant's consent, focusing on: the temporal 
proximity of the illegal detention and the consent, any intervening circumstances, and 
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the officer's unlawful conduct." United States 
v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 818 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1093 (1992). Whether 
the officer informed the suspect of her right to refuse consent or to leave are significant 
factors in the equation. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1994). 
Where only minutes pass between the illegal police activity and the purported consent, 
and where there are no intervening circumstances, a finding of voluntary consent is 
generally not appropriate. See id. at 883. See also United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 
558, 562 (10th Cir. 1994)(government must prove both that consent was voluntary, and 
that there was a break in the events between the consent and the preceding illegality; 
finding that failure to inform defendant of rights to leave and rights to refuse consent 
point to involuntary consent). 
Assuming arguendo that the government could prove that Tripp's consent were 
voluntary, the consent was temporally proximate to and part of her illegal arrest and 
continuing detention. The only arguably attenuating factor was the blood tech's 
reviewing the DUI admonition, and mentioning Tripp's rights to silence, counsel and to 
refuse the test (R. 533: 102). This discussion, coming from the blood tech, undoubtedly 
rang rather hollow to Tripp, given that the discussion occurred after the police informed 
Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest (R. 532: 27; R. 533: 16, 
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31-32, 73), and that the discussion followed the police demand that she take the test and 
telling her that she could not refuse to submit to the blood draw, and that the police would 
get a warrant and take her blood by force if she did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 
28, 35, 71-72). Particularly where the blood was drawn when Tripp was physically 
surrounded and restrained by the police and their agents, after the blood tech tricked her 
into surrendering her arm on the pretense that he would only check to see if there were a 
suitable vein (R. 533: 95), his admonition to her did not attenuate the blood draw from the 
preceding illegalities, but rather, aggravated them. Tripp was not informed that she was 
free to leave, but was instead informed that she was in custody, not free to leave and 
under arrest, and that the police would take her blood by force and get a warrant if she did 
not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). The police were not acting in an effort 
to comply with the Fourth Amendment, but instead, were flagrantly intent on violating it, 
by taking Tripp's blood by force, trickery or any other means necessary (R. 525: 10, 25, 
R. 532: 23, R. 533: 33-34). These facts demonstrate that any purported consent by Tripp 
was tainted by and part of the ongoing violations of Tripp's constitutional privacy rights. 
See, e.g.. Brown and Fernandez, supra. 
Because the warrantless search cannot be justified under the theory of consent, 
suppression is required by Wong Sun and Larocco, supra. 
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III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THERE 
WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE ESTABLISHING EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE BLOOD DRAW WAS 
CORRECT. 
A. There was No Probable Cause to Establish Exigent Circumstances, or to 
Demonstrate that a Warrant Inevitably Would Have Been Discovered. 
The State claims that the court of appeals erred in its factual assessment of 
probable cause by reviewing only those facts which undermined, rather than supported, 
probable cause. State's brief at 23. Appellate courts are not required to detail in writing 
each fact considered by the courts prior to the issuance of any opinion. See, e ^ , State v. 
Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992). Particularly in the "totality of the circumstances" 
analysis, facts are not to be considered in isolation, but are to be considered in their 
totality. Cf., e ^ , United States v. Arvisu. 534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002) (in assessing 
totality of circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion, courts should not "divide and 
conquer" each individual fact in isolation, but should assess the inferences to be drawn by 
considering the facts as a whole). 
The State first attempts to minimize the involvement of Officers Monson and 
Saunders, who testified that they observed no evidence that Tripp was under the 
influence. State's brief at 24. Monson spoke to Tripp from a distance of two feet and 
noticed no odor of alcohol, was present when Detective Roberts was discussing the blood 
draw with her, and tried to shield her eyes as she was terrified and pulling away during 
the blood draw (R. 525: 199 205, R. 533: 67). He saw nothing unusual in the way she 
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spoke and saw no balance problems or other indicia of impairment as she walked from 
the family car to the police car (R. 525: 206-07, R. 533: 69-70). He did not request any 
field sobriety tests (R. 525: 207-08). 
Officer Saunders was the officer who took Tripp's license and talked with her for a 
couple of minutes about the fact that she was the driver in the accident and about how she 
did not see Pracht until she saw him sliding in her rear view mirror (R. 525: 334). He was 
standing two feet from her and asked her if she had consumed any drugs or alcohol, and 
after she said no, he did not suspect otherwise or request field sobriety tests because he 
saw no evidence that she was under the influence (R. 525: 335-336, 376-78, 387). He 
asked her if she would submit to a blood test to rule out the possibility, and she declined, 
saying she was afraid of needles (R. 533: 45). He then asked her to submit to a UA, and 
she agreed to do that (R. 533: 45). He explained to her that he wanted the test to confirm 
that she had not consumed anything, and to rule out that possibility (R. 533: 47). He also 
gave her some forms to complete later (R. 533: 46), but could not recall having done so at 
the time of trial (R. 525: 337-38). After assessing the physical evidence from the 
accident, which indicated that Tripp had pulled out in front of Pracht, Saunders testified 
that he had no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was under the influence of anything (R. 
525: 350). He testified that nothing he saw or heard led him to believe she had consumed 
anything, and that she was not slurring her words (R. 533: 46, 53). He told Officer 
Roberts that he did not see or smell anything (R. 533: 52). The State's efforts to 
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minimize the opportunities these officers had and took to observe Tripp should be 
rejected on the basis of the record discussed above. 
The State complains of the court of appeal's failure to account for Detective 
Roberts' testimony that he became progressively more concerned that Tripp was impaired 
as his investigation proceeded, and the trial court's sixth finding: 
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the 
defendant's eyes did not dissipale with time, she was nervous, she appeared 
to lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily. 
See State's brief at 24-26. 
As an initial matter, finding 6 is incomplete because it does not account for 
Detective Roberts' acknowledgment that shakiness and nervousness would be normal for 
someone involved in a fatal car accident (R. 533: 27), the testimony of the State's own 
witnesses that Tripp was very upset by Ihe accident and continued crying up to and 
throughout the blood draw (R. 532: 44, 48, R. 533: 67, 77, 82), that her red eyes were 
caused by her crying (R. 533: 70, 77), and that Tripp was smoking that night in an effort 
to calm herself (R. 533:77). 
Of central importance here, the court of appeals did address the facts encompassed 
in finding 6, but reasonably held, on the basis of the trial court's finding that the police 
detected no obvious signs of impairment, that there was no probable cause for the blood 
draw. In discussing the interchange between Roberts and Tripp regarding the blood 
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draw, paragraph 6 of Tripp states the relevant facts: 
During this exchange, Detective Roberts observed that Tripp appeared 
nervous, was shaking, and had red eyes without any tears. Detective Roberts 
testified that he began to believe that Tripp was impaired, based on her 
apparent lack of concern for the victim, her continual smoking, and the fact 
that the redness in her eyes was not dissipating. He also acknowledged that 
it was normal for an individual involved in a serious accident to be shaky 
and nervous. 
Paragraph 22 of Tripp explains the court's application of the law to the decisive facts, 
stating, 
On the record before us, we cannot say that the totality of the 
circumstances established probable cause to search Tripp's body for 
incriminating evidence, i.e., to effect the blood draw. Officer Saunders 
testified that he did not have a reasonable suspicion or belief that Tripp was 
intoxicated or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Detective Roberts 
testified that he was only asked by Officer Saunders to help obtain consent 
and that he was not given any information that rose to the level of probable 
cause. Detective Roberts further testified that while he observed that Tripp 
had red eyes, possibly from crying, and that she was nervous and shaking, 
he did not observe slurred speech, smell the odor of alcohol, or conduct any 
field sobriety tests. Officer Monson testified that he did not smell alcohol or 
observe any signs of impairment. Significantly, in its findings of fact, the 
trial court found that "[n]o officer detected the odor of alcohol on the 
defendant, nor did they observe any obvious signs of impairment, such as 
poor balance or slurred speech." 
The court of appeals' analysis squared with the relevant law and facts in the record. 
The State argues that the court of appeals failed to account for the inference that 
Tripp was driving under the influence, which purportedly arose from her pulling into the 
intersection despite having an unobstructed view of Pracht. State's brief at 26. The 
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physical evidence which remained after the accident counters the State's argument, 
because the road Pracht was driving on is hilly and dips three eights of a mile prior to the 
intersection (R. 533: 59-60). The road configuration or Tripp's own doorpost could have 
blocked her view of Pracht's motorcycle as she entered the intersection (R. 533: 60). 
At the time of the collision, Pracht may have been speeding, and this may have 
been the cause of the accident. As the trial court recognized, the State's evidence 
conflicted regarding whether he should have been driving fifty or sixty miles an hour (T. 
526: 563, 696, R; 527: 705, State's Exhibit 30). Tripp had the right to assume that Pracht 
was going the speed limit (R. 533: 60-61). The State's accident reconstructionist 
conceded that, due to a lack of underlying data from the police investigation, he would 
not purchase stock if his decision were based on information of the same quality as he had 
to work with in Tripp's case (R. 526: 516). Nonetheless, he estimated that Pracht was 
driving at least 59 miles an hour, and may have been going faster than that (R. 526: 505, 
514). He testified that if Pracht had been going fifty miles an hour, Tripp would have 
cleared the intersection before Pracht came through, and that there would have been no 
accident (R. 526:516). 
Pracht's braking error may have caused the accident. The point of impact between 
his motorcycle and the rear end of Tripp's truck appeared to be within three feet of either 
side of the center line on U-l 11, the road Pracht was driving on at the time of the crash 
(R. 526: 509). The physical evidence showed that prior to the collision, Pracht was 
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applying only his rear brake (R. 526: 475), and that he skidded for some forty-four feet 
prior to sliding underneath and hitting Tripp's truck (R. 525: 355-56, 358, R. 526: 465). 
Applying only the rear brake on a motorcycle routinely causes them to lose control and 
slide (R. 526: 410, 415). Had Pracht been braking properly, he could have stopped or 
steered around Tripp's truck, rather than sliding underneath and colliding with it as he did 
(R. 532: 37-39). The officers at the scene did not have the benefit of an accident 
reconstructionist, but were left to interpret the physical evidence, which did not indicate 
that Tripp was the cause of the accident, let alone that she was under the influence when 
it occurred. Detective Roberts conceded that Pracht may have been going ninety miles an 
hour (R. 525: 373, R. 532: 32-35). 
On the facts of this case, as accurately stated by the court of appeals, the evidence 
did not establish probable cause of any offense by Tripp. Compare State v. Worwood, 
2007 UT 47, ffl[ 26-36, 164 P.3d 397 (Court found reasonable suspicion but no probable 
cause that Worwood was driving under the influence, given his odor of alcohol, slurred 
speech, and bloodshot eyes, and proximity to crushed beer can, cooler, and large water 
spot on the road, because his walking and balance were steady), with State v. Rodriguez, 
2007 UT 15, fflf 3, 57, 59, 156 P.3d 711 (police had probable cause to justify a warrantless 
blood draw, where driver made an abrupt left turn in front of an oncoming school bus, 
accident was likely to be fatal, defendant had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, and 
vodka bottle was found at the scene of the accident) and People v. Roybal 655 P.2d 410 
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(Colo. 1982) (odor of alcohol emanating from defendant and collision did not give rise to 
probable cause, absent evidence that defendant was responsible for collision). 
The State argues that the court of appeals ignored the weightiest evidence in the 
probable cause equation, discussed in the trial court's eighth finding: 
8. The victim advocate, Cecilia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the 
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car. 
See State's brief at 26-27.15 The State also relies on the testimony of the blood tech that 
he detected an odor of alcohol on Tripp as they spoke, and alleges that the victim 
advocate, Cecelia Budd, noticed that Tripp slurred her words. State's brief at 6, citing R 
533: 84.16 
15Finding 8 is clearly erroneous in indicating that the victim advocate detected an 
odor of alcohol on Tripp when Tripp was in a family car, and there is no evidence to 
marshal in support of it. The victim advocate testified that she thought the odor of 
alcohol in the family car came from Tripp, but did not know Tripp smelled of alcohol 
until Tripp was under arrest and in Detective Roberts' police car, and then did not know if 
the smell came from Tripp's clothing or her mouth (R. 525: 221, 224, R. 533: 76, 78, 86-
87). Tripp made this argument in the court of appeals and the State did not contest it. 
Compare Tripp's opening brief at 8-13 with State's brief at 12 n.3 (acknowledging 
Tripp's challenge and indicating it will address them in its discussion of the blood draw) 
and passim (failing to identify any evidence which supports the finding). 
16
 The assertion regarding purported slurred speech is erroneous. Page 84 of the 
transcript reflects this testimony: 
Q Was she able to speak lucidly? 
A Yeah, she was speaking. 
Q I mean, she wasn't slurring her words? 
A I'm not familiar how she speaks but that day I spoke to her, yeah. 
(R. 533: 84). In this testimony, Budd is agreeing with counsel that Tripp was not slurring 
her words. Assuming arguendo that this testimony is fairly read as an indication that 
Tripp was slurring her speech, there is no evidence that Budd informed the police of any 
such observation. 
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The court of appeals' focus on factors other than odors and speech observed by 
non-police actors, in the absence of any evidence that their observations were conveyed to 
the police prior to the blood draw, is correct. This is because in order to support 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support Fourth Amendment intrusions by the 
police, the facts at issue must be known to the police. See, e ^ , United States v. Stewart, 
867 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1989)(considering facts known by the police in assessing 
lawfulness of search). Cf., e ^ , State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, If 17, 194 P.3d 925 
(reasonableness of detention turns on objective analysis of facts known to the police). 
Because the police never detected an odor of alcohol or slurred speech, and because there 
is no evidence that they were informed of an odor of alcohol or slurred speech prior to the 
blood draw, these factors would not have been proper to include in the objective analysis 
of the facts known to the police which might establish probable cause. See, e.g., Stewart 
and Applegate, supra. 
The court of appeals correctly found that there was no probable cause to justify the 
blood draw, and hence, the warrantless search of Tripp was not justified on the theory of 
exigent circumstances, which requires proof of probable cause. See Tripp, 2008 UT App 
388, Tffl 18-22. The court of appeals also correctly recognized that the absence of 
probable cause defeats the claim that the evidence was salvageable from exclusion under 
the inevitable discovery doctrine, because in the absence of probable cause, the police 
would not inevitably have obtained a warrant and thereby obtained the blood sample. See 
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id at *f 25. Accordingly, on certiorari, this Court should affirm the court of appeals's 
decision. 
B. The Court Should Reject the Claim of Exigent Circumstances. 
The State asks this Court to address the exigent circumstances on certiorari, rather 
than remand to the court of appeals. Slate's brief at 27-28. In arguing exigent 
circumstances, the State relies on the testimony of Officer Roberts that it would take him 
a couple of hours to obtain a warrant, because he would "have to review all the 
information with the officers at the scene,... call another detective to come and help [him] 
draft the warrant and go with [him] to review the warrant with the district attorney and 
then have it signed by a district court judge." The State notes that the accident occurred 
at 7:00 on a Friday night, and argues that the courts would be closed at that time. 
This testimony does not square with the advances in technology and in our law, 
which permitted telephonic warrants at the time of Tripp's blood draw, and which make 
warrants available to the police from magistrates regardless of court hours, in very short 
amounts of time. See State v. Rodriguez. 2007 UT 15, fflf 37-48, 156 P.3d 771 (in 
rejecting State's claim of per se exigent circumstances in dissipating alcohol cases, the 
Court canvassed the legal developments whereby police may obtain warrants by a number 
of very efficient means, which should take between fifteen minutes and an hour). Courts 
are not obliged to accept claims of exigent circumstances which are created by the police. 
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See, e.g.. State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah App. 1993). 
The absence of probable cause that Tripp was impaired by alcohol is dispositive of 
the exigent circumstances claim in any event. Compare Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, f 59 
(finding that compelling evidence and probable cause that driver was impaired in 
apparently fatal accident created exigent circumstance to justify warrantless blood draw). 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' analysis of exigent 
circumstances. 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ANALYSIS 
WAS CORRECT. 
The State contends that the court of appeals misunderstood its burden under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine set forth in State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159, 
and ignored pertinent evidence. State's Brief at 29-32. By reviewing the Tripp decision, 
the Court may readily confirm the correctness of the court of appeals' articulation of the 
State's burden under Topanotes to provide persuasive evidence that the police would have 
obtained the same evidence through means independent from police illegalities. See 
Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, fflf 23-24. Accord Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, If 16. 
Because there was no probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant which 
would have been essential to obtaining the evidence through the independent means of a 
warrant, see Point III of this brief, supra, the court of appeals correctly declined to apply 
the inevitable discovery doctrine. See Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, Tf 25. 
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The State suggests that the court of appeals failed to consider the evidence that 
Detective Roberts told the blood tech that he would call him back in a couple of hours 
after he got a warrant, as proof that the blood inevitably would have been drawn. State's 
Brief at 30. The court of appeals did consider this testimony in noting that the evidentiary 
content of the blood would be dissipating during the time it would take him to apply for a 
warrant he should not have been able to obtain for lack of probable cause in any event. 
Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, lj 24 n.10, and f25. His statement to the blood tech about how 
long it would take to get a warrant, which was made while Tripp was being held in a 
police car, may well have been part of his campaign to compel Tripp to submit to a test 
under threat of a warrant. It is no substitute for proof that he actually would have sought 
a warrant, particularly given the undisputed evidence that given that the police believed 
they did not need a warrant and could forcibly take Tripp's blood, given the seriousness 
of the accident (R. 525: 10, 25, R. 532: 23, R. 533: 33-34). 
The court of appeals did not misunderstand or unfairly augment the State's burden 
under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Rather, the court correctly found that the doctrine 
does not apply on the facts of Tripp's case, because the absence of probable cause to draw 
the blood would not inevitably have resulted in the issuance of a warrant. See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the Tripp decision. Alternatively, the Court should 
remand the matter to the court of appeals for its consideration of the issues left 
unaddressed by the Tripp decision. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 2009. 
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Warrantless searches based on probable cause where 
exigent circumstances obviate the need for a warrant are 
not per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[5] Searches and Seizures 349 €=^180 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349k 179 Validity of Consent 
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Consent to a warrantless search which is not voluntarily 
given is invalid. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[6] Searches and Seizures 349 €=^180 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
The appropriate standard to determine whether consent to 
a warrantless search is voluntary is the totality of the 
circumstances test. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[7] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>180 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349k 179 Validity of Consent 
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
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Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 1 8 4 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl84 k. Custody, Restraint, or Detention 
Issues. Most Cited Cases 
Under the totality of the circumstances test to determine 
whether consent to a warrantless search is voluntary, a 
court should carefully scrutinize both the details of the 
detention, and the characteristics of the defendant. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[8] Searches and Seizures 349 €=^180 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Consent to a warrantless search is not voluntary if it is 
obtained as the product of duress or coercion, express or 
implied. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[9] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 1 9 8 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349VI Judicial Review or Determination 
349k 195 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
349kl98 k. Validity of Consent. Most Cited 
Cases 
Court must look to see if there is clear and positive 
testimony that consent to a warrantless search was 
unequivocal and freely given. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
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[10] Searches and Seizures 349 €=^180 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl80 k. Voluntary Nature in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Consent to a warrantless search is not voluntary where a 
person's will is overborne or his or her capacity for 
self-determination is critically impaired. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[11] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>194 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349VI Judicial Review or Determination 
349kl92 Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
349k 194 k. Consent, and Validity Thereof. Most 
Cited Cases 
The State has the burden of establishing that consent to a 
warrantless search was validly given. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[12] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 2 0 1 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3 49VI Judicial Review or Determination 
349k201 k. Questions of Law or Fact. Most Cited 
Cases 
Voluntariness of consent to a warrantless search is 
primarily a factual question, and the analysis used to 
determine voluntariness is the same without regard to 
whether the consent was obtained after illegal police 
conduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[13] Automobiles 48A €^>418 
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48A Automobiles 
48AIX Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
48Ak417 Grounds for Test 
48Ak418 k. Consent, Express or Implied. Most 
Cited Cases 
Defendant did not voluntarily consent to warrantless 
search consisting of blood draw, where defendant 
continuously refused to submit to blood draw, expressed 
fear of needles, was arrested and threatened that she would 
be forced to provide the blood as soon as warrant was 
obtained, and cried and pulled away during blood draw. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[14] Automobiles 48A €^>418 
48A Automobiles 
48AIX Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
48Ak417 Grounds for Test 
48Ak418 k. Consent, Express or Implied. Most 
Cited Cases 
Defendant's failure to immediately withdraw her arm after 
blood technician said "we can go ahead and [take] care of 
this" did not constitute consent to warrantless blood draw, 
where defendant, who was terrified, crying, and panicked 
throughout, was surrounded in a police car by an officer 
outside the door covering her eyes, a victims' advocate 
kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands, and the 
blood technician outside the car holding her arm where 
she could not see it. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[15] Criminal Law 110 € ^ H 3 4 . 6 0 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110XXIV(L)5 Theory and Grounds of Decision 
in Lower Court 
1 lOkl 134.60 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
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Court of Appeals may affirm the judgment appealed from 
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent 
on the record. 
[16] Automobiles 48A €^>419 
48A Automobiles 
48AIX Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
48Ak417 Grounds for Test 
48Ak419 k. Grounds or Cause; Necessity for 
Arrest. Most Cited Cases 
There was no probable cause to believe that defendant had 
committed an alcohol-related driving offense at the time 
her blood was drawn without her consent, and thus exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement could 
not justify warrantless blood draw, where defendant had 
no odor of alcohol nor any obvious signs of impairment, 
such as poor balance or slurred speech. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[17] Searches and Seizures 349 €=^42.1 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances; 
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant 
349k42.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
A generally recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement is the one referred to as exigent 
circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[18] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>44 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances; 
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant 
349k44 k. Presence of Probable Cause. Most 
Cited Cases 
To justify a warrantless search based on exigent 
circumstances, there must be probable cause. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[19] Searches and Seizures 349 €=>42.1 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances; 
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant 
349k42.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 4 4 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances; 
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant 
349k44 k. Presence of Probable Cause. Most 
Cited Cases 
A warrantless search is constitutionally permissible where 
probable cause and exigent circumstances are proven. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[20] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 4 4 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances; 
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant 
349k44 k. Presence of Probable Cause. Most 
Cited Cases 
The exigencies of a situation may excuse the Fourth 
Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained, but 
not the requirement that a search be premised on probable 
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cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[21] Searches and Seizures 349 €==>40.1 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k40 Probable Cause 
349k40.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Probable cause for a search exists when an officer believes 
that a suspect has committed or is committing an offense. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[22] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>40.1 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k40 Probable Cause 
349k40.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
The facts surrounding a probable cause determination for 
a search are examined in light of the totality of the 
circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[23] Searches and Seizures 349 €=>42.1 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances; 
Opportunity to Obtain Warrant 
349k42.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search may 
exist when there is an urgency to acquire evidence that 
falls outside the ordinary course of law enforcement, such 
as situations where obtaining a warrant would place 
officers or the public at an unacceptable risk or where the 
destruction of essential evidence is imminent. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
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[24] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 5 5 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k53 Scope, Conduct, and Duration of 
Warrantless Search 
349k55 k. Skin, Strip, and Body Searches. Most 
Cited Cases 
Where what is sought to be searched is a person's body, 
sufficient probable cause for a warrantless search exists 
only when there is a clear indication that evidence will be 
found as a result of the search. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[25] Criminal Law 110 €^394.1(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
110XVII(I) Competency m General 
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained 
110k394.1 In General 
110k394.1(3) k. Effect of Illegal Conduct 
on Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
The crux of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that since 
tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered 
through an independent source, it should be admissible if 
it inevitably would have been discovered. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[26] Criminal Law 110 €=^394.1(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
11OXVII Evidence 
110XVII(I) Competency in General 
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained 
110k394.1 In General 
110k394.1(3) k. Effect of Illegal Conduct 
on Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
For tainted evidence to be admissible under the inevitable 
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discovery doctrine, there must be some independent basis 
for discovery, and the investigation that inevitably would 
have led to the evidence must be independent of the 
constitutional violation tainting the evidence. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[27] Criminal Law 110 €^394.4(13) 
110 Criminal Law 
11 OXVII Evidence 
110XVII(I) Competency in General 
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained 
110k394.4 Unlawful Search or Seizure 
110k394.4(13) k. Persons. Most Cited 
Cases 
Inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to allow 
admission of results of warrantless blood draw from 
defendant without her consent in prosecution for 
automobile homicide, where detective would not have 
necessarily been able to obtain warrant for forcible blood 
draw based on available evidence. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[28] Criminal Law 110 €^394.1(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
11 OXVII Evidence 
110XVII(I) Competency in General 
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained 
110k394.1 In General 
110k394.1(3) k. Effect of Illegal Conduct 
on Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
For tainted evidence to be admissible under the inevitable 
discovery doctrine, there must be persuasive evidence of 
events or circumstances apart from those resulting in 
illegal police activity that would have inevitably led to 
discovery. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
*101 Ronald J. Yengich, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and ORME. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
U 1 Alleging error in the denial of her pretrial motion to 
suppress evidence, Susan Tripp appeals from her jury 
conviction of automobile homicide. We conclude that the 
appeal is well-taken, reverse the trial court's denial of the 
motion to suppress evidence, and remand for a new trial. 
* 102 BACKGROUND 
Tf 2"The legal analysis of search and seizure cases is highly 
fact dependent." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, | 2, 103 
P.3d 699. We therefore recite the facts in some detail. 
\ 3 On April 23, 2004, Tripp was driving eastbound on 
the Old Bingham Highway in Salt Lake County, Utah. She 
stopped at the stop sign at the U-l l l intersection and, 
after stopping, pulled out and collided with a motorcyclist 
traveling southbound on U-l 11 .^The motorcyclist died 
soon after from injuries sustained in the crash. 
FN1. Trial testimony by experts put the 
motorcyclist's speed just prior to impact at about 
sixty miles per hour, the posted speed limit. 
\ 4 Police and emergency personnel immediately arrived 
on the scene, including West Jordan Police Officer 
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Saunders, who asked Tripp if he could obtain a blood 
sample from her. Although Officer Saunders testified at 
trial that he did not observe any signs indicating that 
Tripp was impaired and that he did not have any 
reasonable suspicion that she was under the influence of 
any substance, he testified that he seeks blood draws in 
serious accidents as a matter of course. And the trial court, 
in its findings, indicated that "[n]o officer detected the 
odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe any 
obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or 
slurred speech." Tripp denied consuming alcohol or 
prescription drugs when asked by Officer Saunders. 
If 5 Tripp told Officer Saunders that she did not want to 
submit to a blood test because she did not like needles but 
that she was willing to consent to a urinalysis. Officer 
Saunders then conferred with an automobile homicide 
investigator, Detective Roberts, informing him that Tripp 
was unwilling to submit to a blood draw because she was 
scared of needles. After some discussion, the two officers 
determined that a blood sample was necessary and decided 
to renew the effort to obtain Tripp's consent for a blood 
draw. ™2 
FN2. The record is devoid of any indication that 
a Breathalyzer or Intoxilyzer test was 
considered-a rather curious fact given that Tripp 
was not generally uncooperative and stood ready 
to provide a urine sample or even a blood 
sample, provided a needle was not used. One 
might surmise that a suspect ready to provide a 
roadside urine sample would readily provide a 
breath sample instead, if given that choice. Nor 
did Officer Saunders or Detective Roberts at any 
time request that Tripp undergo any alternative 
tests, such as field sobriety tests. 
f 6 Detective Roberts then approached Tripp and again 
asked for her consent to a blood draw, which she refused 
to provide-again citing her fear of needles. She renewed 
the offer to furnish a urine sample and, indeed, a blood 
sample-provided a needle was not used to obtain it. 
Detective Roberts told Tripp that he did not know of any 
other way to obtain blood and suggested that her fear of 
needles was something that could be worked around. 
Detective Roberts explained that the department's blood 
technician was highly skilled and would be able to do the 
draw quickly and relatively painlessly. During this 
exchange, Detective Roberts observed that Tripp 
appeared nervous, was shaking, and had red eyes without 
any tears. Detective Roberts testified that he began to 
believe that Tripp was impaired, based on her apparent 
lack of concern for the victim, her continual smoking, and 
the fact that the redness in her eyes was not dissipating. He 
also acknowledged that it was normal for an individual 
involved in a serious accident to be shaky and nervous. 
K 7 Because Detective Roberts's further attempts to obtain 
Tripp's consent were unsuccessful, he approached the 
department's victims' rights advocates, whose presence is 
often requested at the scene of serious accidents, for 
assistance, to see "if they could calm [ Tripp] down and 
... have her become more relaxed to the idea of having a 
blood draw." In the presence of Tripp's family-who had 
arrived at the scene a few minutes after the accident-and 
the advocates, Detective Roberts again asked Tripp to 
submit to a blood draw, and Tripp "adamantly refused to 
submit." Based on this refusal and protestations from 
Tripp's family at his repeated requests for a blood draw, 
Detective Roberts took Tripp into custody,™3 removing 
her from *103 her vehicle and placing her in the back of 
a police vehicle. Detective Roberts told Tripp that she 
was now in custody and that he was going to obtain a 
warrant and force the blood draw. Detective Roberts, 
however, never tried to secure the warrant because the 
blood technician, Brian Davis, arrived on the scene 
immediately after this exchange. 
FN3. Throughout the briefs, both parties seem to 
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use the concepts of "arrest" and "custody" 
interchangeably. Indeed, at the suppression 
hearing, Detective Roberts testified both that he 
took Tripp into "custody" and that he put her 
under arrest. Because the parties consistently 
characterize Tripp's custody as amounting to an 
arrest, we have no occasion to consider whether 
her detention was only a "level two" 
investigative detention. See generally State v. 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 21, 164 P.3d 397. 
U 8 Detective Roberts explained the situation to Davis-that 
Tripp would not consent, that it was going to take several 
hours to obtain a warrant, and that he would call Davis 
back once the warrant had been obtained. Upon learning 
that Tripp refused consent only because of her fear of 
needles, Davis replied, "[W]ell, if that's all it is, let me talk 
to her. I'm usually pretty good at getting them to work 
around their fear of needles." Davis then went to talk with 
Tripp in the back of Officer Monson's patrol car. 
\ 9 Davis tried to reassure Tripp of the relative ease and 
painlessness of the blood draw procedure. Tripp insisted 
that she was afraid and that even her own doctor would not 
draw her blood because of her fear. Davis testified that he 
thought he would be able to obtain her consent based on 
his reassurances, told this to Detective Roberts, and said, 
"I really think we can probably go ahead and do this. 
We've got her reassured and talked into this[.]" Davis then 
put a tourniquet on Tripp's arm to see "if we can find a 
spot that would be easy to do this," to which Tripp 
responded, "Okay, we'll go ahead and do that." Tripp 
stuck her arm out for Davis to apply the tourniquet. Davis 
told her that he found an easy site and that "we can go 
ahead and [take] care of this." Davis testified that Tripp 
probably did not know that he had his equipment ready 
and that he was prepared to draw her blood and that he 
"just kind of stuck her with the needle as quick as [he] 
could and got the blood done." During the draw, Tripp 
was in a police car with an officer outside the door 
Page 8 
covering her eyes, a victims' rights advocate kneeling in 
front of her holding one of her hands, and Davis outside 
the car door holding her arm in such a way that she could 
not see it. Cecilia Budd, the victims' rights advocate who 
was with her, consistently reassured Tripp and told her 
that she had seen Davis draw blood before and that he was 
very good. After the draw, Tripp became calm and was 
surprised that the blood draw was done. 
f 10 Officer Monson, who witnessed the blood draw, 
testified that"[ Tripp] looked terrified. She had talked to 
us about her fear of needles and she looked terrified." He 
also testified that she was "pulling away. She was crying," 
but that she had "offered her arm." Budd testified that, at 
times, Tripp was uncontrollably crying. The blood draw 
showed a metabolite of cocaine and a blood alcohol level 
just above the legal limit. 
K 11 The State charged Tripp with automobile homicide, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 
76-5-207(2), seeUtah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) 
(Supp.2007), and with failure to yield the right of way, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section 
41-6-72.10(3), jeeUtah Code Ann. §41-6-72.10(3) (1998) 
(current version at Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-902 (2005)). 
Tripp moved to suppress the blood test results. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the motion to suppress was denied. 
The trial court found that Tripp voluntarily consented to 
the blood draw, that her initial refusal was based "solely 
on her fear of needles, and [that] the evidence 
demonstrates that at the time of the blood draw the 
defendant's fear was resolved." Having been convicted 
following a jury trial, Tripp now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f 12 Tripp argues that the trial court erred in denying her 
motion to suppress. Specifically, Tripp challenges the 
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trial court's finding that she consented to the blood 
draw.™4 *104 "We review the factual findings underlying 
the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. 
However, we review the trial court's conclusions of law 
based on these findings for correctness [.]" State v. Veteto, 
2000 UT 62, 11 8, 6 P.3d 1133 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Further, we grant no deference 
to the trial court in its application of the law to its factual 
findings. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, H 15, 103 P.3d 
699.™ 
FN4. It was suggested from the bench during oral 
argument before this court that perhaps Tripp 
had consented to providing a blood sample, just 
not to the method employed in extracting it, and 
that given that her articulated concern was on 
that basis rather than protections enshrined in the 
Fourth or Fifth Amendments, the blood draw 
might constitute a battery but should not trigger 
evidentiary suppression. That angle was not 
pursued by the State, perhaps because of the 
reality that blood can only be extracted by means 
of a needle, and we are aware of no authority 
supporting the notion that it is conceptually 
possible to consent to a blood draw while 
withholding consent to being pricked with a 
needle. 
FN5. Tripp also argues that the trial court erred 
in not allowing the jurors to consider whether the 
motorcyclist's conduct was a superseding cause 
of the accident. Given our disposition, we need 
not address this issue. 
ANALYSIS 
[1][2][3][4] U 13 The Fourth Amendment prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures, including in situations 
where blood is drawn from a suspect and then analyzed. 
See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives'Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,616,109 S.Ct. 1402. 103 
L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)), cert denied,9%2 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999). "[S]earches conducted... without [warrants]... are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 
S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnotes omitted). 
Such exceptions include searches based on valid consent, 
see State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990), and 
searches based on probable cause where exigent 
circumstances obviate the need for a warrant, see State v. 
Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, f 16, 156 P.3d 771. 
I. Consent 
[5][6][7][8][9][10][11] 1 14 We start with consideration 
of whether Tripp consented voluntarily to the blood draw. 
"[Cjonsent which is not voluntarily given is invalid." 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218,228,93 S.Ct. 2041,36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); 
Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 292-93. The appropriate standard 
to determine whether consent is voluntary "is the totality 
of the circumstances test." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 
1j56,63 P.3d 650. "Under the totality of the circumstances 
test, a court should carefully scrutinize both the details of 
the detention, and the characteristics of the defendant." Id. 
(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041). 
"Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as 'the product 
of duress or coercion, express or implied.' " State v. 
Eisner, 2001 UT 99,1f47,37 P.3d 1073 (citation omitted). 
" '[W]e further look to see if there is clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely 
given.'" Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at293 (citation omitted). "In 
other words, a person's will cannot be overborne, nor may 
his "capacity for self-determination [be] critically 
impaired.' " Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 57, 63 P.3d 650 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). The State, of 
course, has the burden of establishing that consent was 
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validly given. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. 
[12] f 15"Voluntariness is primarily a factual question, 
and the analysis used to determine voluntariness is the 
same without regard to whether the consent was obtained 
after illegal police conduct." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1262 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). Thus, if we 
determine that Tripp did not voluntarily consent to having 
her blood drawn, we need not reach the issue of "whether 
the consent was obtained by police exploitation of [a] 
prior illegality." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. See also 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. The State argues that Tripp 
voluntarily consented to a warrantless blood draw in light 
of the totality of the circumstances. We disagree. 
[13] K 16 Given the totality of the circumstances, we 
cannot say that there is "clear and positive testimony" that 
Tripp "unequivocally] and freely" consented to having 
her blood drawn. See Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 293 (citation 
omitted). After refusing to submit * 105 to a blood draw 
several times-to Officer Saunders, to Detective Roberts, 
and to Brian Davis-Tripp was informed that she was in 
custody, removed from the presence of her family, and 
placed in a police car. Detective Roberts testified that she 
was arrested because "the more [the officers] tried to 
convince her, the more defiant she became ... and we were 
losing control of the situation." She was told that if she did 
not submit, a warrant would be obtained and she would be 
forced to give a blood sample. A warrant was never 
sought, however, because the blood technician, Brian 
Davis, told Detective Roberts, "I really think we can 
probably go ahead and do this." When Tripp extended her 
arm prior to the blood test, to the extent the gesture was 
voluntary at all under the circumstances, it was in response 
to Davis's telling her that he was going to apply the 
tourniquet and see if he could find an easy spot to draw 
blood. Davis even testified that he was not sure that Tripp 
knew that he had his blood drawing equipment ready and 
was prepared to draw her blood when she extended her 
arm. Once he found an easy site to draw from, he told her 
"we can go ahead and [take] care of this," and he 
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proceeded to immediately draw her blood without an 
express indication of her consent and without first 
allowing her to reaffirm, yet again, her refusal to consent. 
[14] If 17 The State contends that Trippfs failure to 
immediately withdraw her arm must be taken as a clear 
indication of her consent. We cannot agree. During the 
blood draw, Tripp was surrounded by people working for 
the State-she was in a police car with an officer outside the 
door covering her eyes, a victims' advocate kneeling in 
front of her holding one of her hands, and the blood 
technician outside the car holding her arm where she could 
not see it. All the while Tripp was, according to the 
witnesses, terrified, crying, and panicked. Given the 
context of the threat of a forced blood draw, her arrest by 
the police, and the presence and participation of the State's 
many actors during the blood draw, we cannot say that 
Tripp voluntarily consented to have her blood drawn 
simply because she failed to retract her arm in the instant 
between when Davis said "we can go ahead and [take] 
care of this"-an ambiguous comment as concerns the 
timing of the intended blood draw in any event-and when 
he inserted the needle. Indeed, Officer Monson, the officer 
who witnessed the draw, testified that although Tripp 
initially offered her arm to Davis, "[s]he was pulling 
away," and "[s]he was crying. I tried to shield her eyes so 
[she] wouldn't look at the needle." The State argues that 
this is a natural response from someone who fears needles. 
We think, however, that given the context of her 
continuous refusals to submit to a blood draw, her 
expressed fear of needles, her arrest, the threat that she 
would be forced to provide the blood as soon as a warrant 
was obtained,™6 and her crying and pulling away during 
the blood draw, the State has failed to meet its burden and 
to demonstrate that Tripp voluntarily gave consent under 
the totality of the circumstances.™7 See generally Arroyo, 
796 P.2d at 687. 
FN6. Although in many cases such a "threat" 
would be neither inaccurate nor coercive, see, 
e.g., State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1207 
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(Utah 1995); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 
1273-74 (Utah Ct.App.1990), this is not such a 
case. Here, as discussed in Part II, there was no 
demonstrated probable cause to justify an 
involuntary blood draw. 
FN7. This case stands in stark contrast to State v. 
Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct.App.1998), 
cert denied,982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999), where we 
readily agreed with the State that a defendant 
who offered his arm to a blood technician had 
consented to the blood draw. See id. at 293. In 
that case, the defendant offered no resistance, the 
defendant did not say "no" or object in any way, 
and the defendant's blood was taken in a much 
less coercive environment, i.e., the defendant 
was in the back of an ambulance with only one 
officer present. 
II. Exigent Circumstances 
circumstances." See State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15,^16, 
156 P.3d 771. But to justify a warrantless search based on 
exigent circumstances, there must still be probable cause. 
See State v. Vallasenor-Meza, 2005 UT App 65, f 9, 108 
P.3d 123 ("[A] warrantless search ... is constitutionally 
permissible where probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are proven.") (first alteration in original) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. 
Comer, 2002 UT App 219, ffi[ 21, 24, 51 P.3d 55 (same), 
cert denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). In other words, the 
exigencies of a situation may excuse the Fourth 
Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained, but 
not the requirement that a search be premised on probable 
cause. 
[21][22] Tf 20 Probable cause exists when "an officer ... 
believe[s] that the suspect has committed or is committing 
an offense." Despain, 2007 UT App 367, K 9, 173 P.3d 
213 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The 
facts surrounding a probable cause determination are 
examined in light of the totality of the circumstances. See 
id 
[15][16] If 18 The State next asks us to affirm Tripp's 
conviction because Detective Roberts was justified in 
"forcing a blood draw under the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement."While this court 
"may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable 
on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record,"State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, f 11, 173 
P.3d *106 213 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted), we do not agree that the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement justified the 
warrantless blood draw in this case.™8 
FN8. Neither, apparently, did the trial court, 
which premised its decision entirely on consent. 
[ 17] [ 18] [ 19] [20] K19 A generally recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement is the one referred to as "exigent 
[23 ] [24] ^ 21 Exigent circumstances may exist when there 
is "an urgency to acquire evidence that falls outside the 
ordinary course of law enforcement,"7todngwez, 2007 UT 
15, If 16,156 P.3d 771, such as situations where obtaining 
a warrant would place officers or the public at an 
unacceptable risk or where the destruction of essential 
evidence is imminent, see id. And where what is sought to 
be searched is a person's body, "sufficient probable cause 
exists only [when there is] 'a clear indication that evidence 
will be found as a result of the search.' " State v. Alverez, 
2006 UT 61,1 22, 147 P.3d 425 (quoting Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 
908(1966)). 
f 22 On the record before us, we cannot say that the 
totality of the circumstances established probable cause to 
search Trippfs body for incriminating evidence, i.e., to 
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effect the blood draw. Officer Saunders testified that he 
did not have a reasonable suspicion or belief that Tripp 
was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
Detective Roberts testified that he was only asked by 
Officer Saunders to help obtain consent and that he was 
not given any information that rose to the level of probable 
cause. Detective Roberts further testified that while he 
observed that Tripp had red eyes, possibly from crying, 
and that she was nervous and shaking, he did not observe 
slurred speech, smell the odor of alcohol, or conduct any 
field sobriety tests. Officer Monson testified that he did 
not smell alcohol or observe any signs of impairment. 
Significantly, in its findings of fact, the trial court found 
that "[n]o officer detected the odor of alcohol on the 
defendant, nor did they observe any obvious signs of 
impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech." 
Thus, the State has not met its burden of demonstrating 
that there was probable cause to believe that Tripp had 
committed an alcohol-related offense at the time her blood 
was drawn without her consent, FN9 and we thus have no 
occasion to determine whether sufficient exigent 
circumstances existed to excuse obtaining a warrant. See 
Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f 21, 147 P.3d 425. 
FN9. Whether or not sufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause for a blood draw could 
have been garnered is an entirely different 
matter. Given the investigating officers' 
single-minded focus on getting Tripp to consent 
to have her blood drawn, amassing facts to 
establish probable cause was simply not their 
objective. Had it been, they could have employed 
field sobriety tests and perhaps a Breathalyzer or 
Intoxilyzer test to develop probable cause for 
taking a sample of Tripp's blood. 
III. Inevitable Discovery 
[25][26][27] f 23 Additionally, the State contends that 
Tripp's blood alcohol content would inevitably have been 
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discovered and that we should therefore affirm the denial 
of the motion to suppress. The crux of the *107 inevitable 
discovery doctrine is that since " 'tainted evidence would 
be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent 
source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have 
been discovered.' " State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^  14, 
76 P.3d 1159 (citation omitted). However, "there must be 
some 'independent basis for discovery,' and 'the 
investigation that inevitably would have led to the 
evidence [must] be independent of the constitutional 
violation.' " Id % 16 (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted). 
[28] U 24 The State's argument that it would inevitably 
have discovered the blood alcohol evidence is conjectural 
at best. The record does not indicate that a warrant would 
actually have been issued in this case or that the desired 
blood test results would actually have been obtained 
thereby.™10 "For courts confidently to predict what would 
have occurred, ... there must be persuasive evidence of 
events or circumstances apart from those resulting in 
illegal police activity that would have inevitably led to 
discovery." Id. 
FN 10. Detective Roberts told Brian Davis it 
would be several hours before a warrant could be 
obtained, during which time the alcohol in 
Tripp's system would be dissipating. 
If 25 There is no such persuasive evidence here. Indeed, 
the only evidence relevant to securing a warrant was that 
Officer Saunders did not believe a warrant was required in 
serious accidents, that Detective Roberts threatened to 
obtain a warrant and force a blood draw, and that 
Detective Roberts thought obtaining a warrant would take 
a few hours. In any event, we have already held that the 
record before us does not establish a basis for concluding 
that there was probable cause to justify a forcible blood 
draw. We therefore cannot say that Detective Roberts 
would have necessarily been able to obtain a warrant 
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based on the available evidence, and thus we decline to 
affirm on the basis of the inevitable discovery doclrine. 
CONCLUSION 
U 26 We reverse the trial court's denial of Tripp's motion 
to suppress the blood test results because the State did not 
meet its burden of proving that her consent was voluntary. 
We also decline to affirm on the exigent circumstances 
rationale offered by the State because the State did not 
demonstrate that there was probable cause for a forcible 
blood draw. Nor does the inevitable discovery doctrine 
provide a proper basis on which to affirm. Accordingly, 
we reverse the denial of the motion to suppress and 
remand for a new trial or such other proceedings as may 
now be appropriate. 
1 27 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Presiding Judge, and JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge. 
Utah App.,2008. 
State v. Tripp 
197 P.3d 99, 616 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2008 UT App 388 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SUSAN TRIPP, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCUSIONS OF LAW 
0£lH o33oo 
Case No. 944404-951 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, having come before this Court for 
hearing m the above entitled manner on February 25, 2005, and Oral Argument on April 
18, 2005, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Barton J. Warren, and the 
State was represented by co-counsel, Kim Cordova and Sandi Johnson. The Court having 
reviewed the parties' written briefs and considered oral arguments of counsel, the Court 
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant was involved in an auto-motorcycle accident, which resulted in 
the death of Daniel Pracht. 
2. The defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test and stated that officers 
could test her blood if they did not use a needle 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 26 2005 
8ALT LAKE ^ T Y 
Deputy Clerk 
3. The defendant's initial refusal to take a blood test was based solely on her fear 
of needles. 
4. When speaking with Officer Saunders, the defendant denied using alcohol or 
drugs and expressed her fear of needles. 
5. Detective Roberts talked with the defendant multiple times. The more he 
spoke with the victim, the more concerned he became that she was impaired 
by something. 
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the 
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared to 
lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily. 
7. No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe 
any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech. 
8. The victim advocate, Cecelia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the 
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car. 
9. The defendant was eventually placed in Detective Roberts un-marked vehicle 
and secluded from her family and friends because they were interfering with 
the investigation. 
10. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was seated in Detective Roberts 
unmarked vehicle. The defendant was seated halfway in the vehicle, with the 
door open and her legs outside the vehicle. 
11. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was not handcuffed or shackled. 
2 
12. At the time of the blood draw, Mr. Davis and Cecelia Budd were present, and 
neither was in uniform or armed. Officer Monson was also nearby, but he was 
not in uniform. 
13. Mr. Davis, the blood technician, spoke to the defendant about a blood draw 
and Mr. Davis could detect an odor of alcohol from the defendant. 
14. Mr. Davis reviewed with the defendant her right to remain silent, her right to 
counsel, and her right to refuse the test. 
15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the 
defendant voluntarily extended her arm. 
16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tried to withdraw her 
arm and she never said "no" or "stop." 
17. When the blood draw was over, the defendant was immediately calm and 
stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be. 
3 
1- The defendant' 
CONCLUSIONS OFT A W 
s initial refusal was based solely on her fear of needles, and 
^ e evidence demonstrates that at the time of the blood draw the defendant': 
fear was resolved. 
2- The defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw. 
3- The evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw is admissible. 
DATED this ^ i day of ^ 2 0 0 5 . 
BY THE COURT: 
4 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
United States v. Arrington. 2008 WL 4459378 
(unpublished decision) 
Westlaw, 
Slip Copy 
Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4459378 (S.D.Fla.) 
(Cite as: 2008 WL 4459378 (S.D.Fla.)) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
S.D. Florida. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Gregory ARRINGTON, Defendant. 
No. 08-20395-CR. 
Oct. 2, 2008. 
Sharad Anand Motiani, United States Attorney's Office, 
Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
ADOPTING MAGISTRA TErS REPORT AND 
RECOMMEND A TION 
FEDERICO A. MORENO, District Judge. 
*1 THIS MATTER was referred to the Honorable Edwin 
Torres, United States Magistrate Judge. A Report and 
Recommendation [D.E. # 35] has been filed and the 
Government has filed an Objection to the Report and 
Recommendation [D.E. # 38] and the Defendant has 
responded [D.E. # 39]. 
After a de novo review the Court is overruling the 
Government's objection and suppressing the evidence for 
the reasons stated in the Magistrate's Report. 
DONE and ORDERED in Miami-Dade County Florida 
Page 1 
this 1st day of October 2008. 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
STA TEMENTS AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
EDWIN G. TORRES, United States Magistrate Judge. 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Statements and Physical Evidence [D.E. 24] that 
seeks to suppress all statements and physical evidence 
obtained from Defendant following an alleged unlawful 
entry into a motel room he was occupying on April 10, 
2007. The Government responded in opposition to the 
motion [D.E. 25]. Following the referral of the motion to 
the undersigned Magistrate Judge [D.E. 26], an 
evidentiary hearing was conducted on August 29, 2008. 
The parties then submitted supplemental briefing in 
support of their positions based on the testimony elicited 
at the hearing. [D.E. 31,34]. The Court has reviewed the 
entire record in the case, from which the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are based. Upon 
review of that record, there is no choice but to recommend 
that the Defendant's Motion be Granted. 
/. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Homestead police officers Ricky Rivera and Lewis Hosch 
testified at the hearing on behalf of the Government. They 
testified that on April 10, 2007, Officer Anthony Green 
from the Homestead Police Department received a tip 
from an individual seeking credit for cooperation with law 
enforcement. That individual identified Gregory Arrington 
by name as someone who was selling narcotics out of 
Room 135 of the Caribe Motel located at 841 N. Krome 
Avenue. The source also told the police that the individual 
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was armed with a gun. 
The Caribe Motel is known to the Homestead Police as a 
location that has been used for prostitution and narcotics 
activities. Gregory Arrington, however, was not known to 
the officers, nor was his background investigated by 
officers at that time. Instead, members of the Homestead 
Police Special Investigations Unit then proceeded to the 
Caribe Motel to conduct a "knock and talk" investigation 
of Room 135. Their plan was first to try and see what the 
occupant would do if an officer approached asking to buy 
drugs. If that did not work, the officers intended to get the 
occupant to open the door. Several plain clothes officers 
from the Unit were part of the team, together with two 
uniformed Homestead police officers. 
At approximately 12:18 P.M., the officers went to the 
Caribe Motel. Room 135 is at the far end of the ground 
floor to the two-story building. The room has no window 
adjacent to the door from where an occupant could see out 
to the front area, though the door itself has a small peep 
hole. Detective Rivera, in plain clothes, knocked on the 
door, while the accompanying officers stood by to his 
right side away from the door. Detective Rivera, as 
planned, initially attempted to impersonate a narcotics 
purchaser, using a name like "Julio" who wanted to buy 
some drugs. The occupant inside the motel room, who we 
know now was Defendant Gregory Arrington, responded 
by asking "Who?" The officer repeated what he had said 
a few times, but the occupant kept asking "Who?" and 
then said "Go away." Detective Rivera then knocked on 
the door again. This time, however, he identified himself 
as a Homestead police officer and directed thai the 
Defendant open the door: "Homestead Police. Open the 
Door." 
*2 At the hearing, Detective Rivera initially attempted to 
downplay how forceful he may have been in coaxing 
Defendant to open the door. On cross-examineition, 
however, Detective Rivera was quite clear that he directed 
the occupant to open the door and "come out for a minute 
....I want to talk to you."Detective Hosch, who was the 
team leader and organized the operation, never wavered 
that the officers told the occupant to "open the door" 
several times. At the moment that Detective Rivera 
demanded that the occupant open the door, he was armed, 
was displaying his badge around his neck, was wearing a 
police vest, and was accompanied by at least four other 
armed Homestead Police Detectives and uniformed 
officers. 
After several knocks and repeated commands from 
Detective Rivera to "open the door," the Defendant then 
partially opened the door with his left hand. As he did so, 
Detective Rivera quickly observed that the Defendant was 
holding a revolver in his right hand against his side. 
Detective Rivera immediately began alternating between 
identifying himself as a police officer and ordering the 
defendant to drop the gun. The Detective dropped to one 
knee in a bracing position, pointed his gun at the 
Defendant, and blocked the door from closing with his 
foot. The Defendant then began walking backwards in the 
motel room, while facing Detective Rivera with the gun 
still held in his right hand. The Defendant then complied 
with Detective Rivera's orders and dropped the firearm 
behind him onto the bed. 
The officers then moved in to the motel room and secured 
the defendant, the firearm, and a woman by the name of 
Lisa Carter who was also inside. The officers immediately 
conducted a sweep of the room. They could see crack 
cocaine and curency on top of a microwave near the front 
door crack. They could also see in plain view two bags of 
marijuana on the table. They also seized the revolver from 
the bed that was loaded with six rounds of ammunition. 
The Defendant was then taken to the police station for 
processing and an interview. At approximately 1:55 P.M., 
the Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights by 
Detective Harris and Detective Rivera. The Defendant 
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acknowledged that he understood his rights by writing his 
initials next to each right. He then indicated that he wished 
to waive his rights and make a statement. He signed the 
Miranda form. The Defendant admitted that he possessed 
the gun to protect himself from an individual who had 
previously threatened him. 
The pending motion seeks to suppress the physical 
evidence obtained from the motel room, as well as the 
Defendant's subsequent statements, as fruit of the 
poisonous tree stemming from an illegal entry into the 
motel room. Defendant's motion argued that there was no 
probable cause or exigent circumstances to enter the motel 
room. Following the facts elicited at the hearing, however, 
Defendant's argument focused on whether Defendant 
voluntarily consented to open the motel room door, as the 
Government argues, or whether he merely submitted to 
lawful authority by complying with their order to open the 
door. Defendant does not dispute that, if the door was 
voluntarily opened, Defendant's pointing of a gun in their 
direction entitled the officers to secure the Defendant and 
conduct a protective sweep of the room. Defendant instead 
argues that the door was not opened by consent and that 
the officers in effect forced their way into the motel room 
without a warrant. 
*3 The Government does not argue that there was 
probable cause to enter the motel room upon the officers' 
arrival to the area. Instead, the Government limits its 
argument to the consent issue-that Defendant voluntarily 
opened the door in response to a request from Detective 
Rivera, which was clearly an exception to the warrant 
requirement. Having provided that consent, the officers 
had the right to protect themselves when presented with an 
armed individual at the door. Note as well that the 
Government does not dispute that, if the entry into the 
motel room was in fact unlawful, the subsequent seizure of 
the physical evidence and the Defendant's statements 
related to that evidence should be suppressed under the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 
III. ANALYSIS 
"It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that 
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable."Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 
(1980)."Except in special situations, we have consistently 
held that the entry into a home to conduct a search or 
make an arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant."Steagald 
v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 
L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). That is because "the Fourth 
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the 
house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may 
not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.'Vd. at 212 
(citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 590). 
The Government concedes that, for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, this presumption applies with equal force to a 
hotel or motel room because the same expectation of 
privacy exists for such a dwelling. See, e.g., United States 
v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1022 (11th Cir.1994); United 
States v. Newbern, 731 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir.1984). 
Hence, the burden on the government to justify a 
warrantless entry into this temporary dwelling-Defendant's 
motel room at the Caribe Motel-is a heavy one: 
The general requirement that a search warrant be obtained 
is not lightly to be dispensed with, and the burden is on 
those seeking an exemption from the requirement to 
show the need for it.... 
United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662,669 (11th Cir.2000) 
(internal quotation marks, quotations omitted); see also 
United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1325 (11th 
Cir. 1983) ("Because the protections of the fourth 
amendment are crucial to a free and viable society, the 
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government shoulders a heavy burden of justifying the 
failure to obtain a warrant prior to the intrusion."); Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 
L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) ("With few exceptions, the question 
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and 
hence constitutional must be answered no."). 
Consent to a warrantless entry or search is one of the 
limited exceptions to the warrant requirement that can 
satisfy the Government's burden. Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429,439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) 
("The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable 
searches and seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary 
cooperation."); United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 
1241 (11th Cir.1999). In order for there to be valid 
consent in lieu of a warrant, and to overcome the 
presumption of unreasonableness, the Government must 
prove "that the necessary consent was obtained and that it 
was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not 
satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of 
lawful authority."Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 
103 S.Ct. 1319,75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The Government 
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, thmt the 
consent was unequivocal, specifically and intentionally 
given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. 
E.g., id. at 497-9$\UnitedStates v. Worley, 193 F.3d380, 
386 (6th Cir. 1999)."Consent that is the product of official 
intimidation or harassment is not consent at all. Citizens 
do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they are 
coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to 
refuse."Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. 
*4 Whether or not there was free and voluntary consent is 
a factual question that must be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances involved. E.g., United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 
64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 
(1973))."The standard for measuring the scope of a 
suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 
objective reasonableness-what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange 
between the officer and the suspect."Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248,250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 
(1991). Several factors may be considered in deciding 
whether or not there was voluntary consent: the custodial 
status, the presence of coercive police procedures, the 
extent and level of the person's cooperation with the 
police, awareness of the right to refuse to consent to the 
search, intelligence and education, and the belief that no 
incriminating evidence would be found. United States v. 
Blake, 888 F.2d at 79S;UnitedStates v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 
at 1241, 
The Court finds that the Government has failed to meet its 
burden in this case of showing that Defendant freely and 
voluntarily consented to his seizure by opening the door to 
the motel room. Applying the Schneckloth factors to the 
record in this case, we readily find that almost all the 
relevant factors support the Defendant's position that he 
did not voluntarily open the door to talk with the officers. 
Instead, the record shows that Defendant submitted to the 
officer's command to open the motel room door. The 
typical reasonable person would have done the same 
thing-submit to the officer's lawful authority and open the 
door as they directed. 
The Court's findings of fact show that Defendant opened 
the door in response to repeated commands from Office 
Rivera of the Homestead Police Department to do so. 
Those commands followed an unsuccessful attempt to 
coerce Defendant to open the door through a ruse of a 
drug buy. When a suspicious Defendant did not take the 
bait, and told the person at the door to "go away," the 
officers identified themselves as officers, told Defendant 
they wanted to talk with him, and instructed him to "open 
the door." After several attempts went unanswered, the 
officers persisted. As Detective Hosch testified, Officer 
Rivera told Defendant to "open the door" several times. 
That is when Defendant opened the door. All evidence 
points in the direction of acquiescence to lawful authority, 
and not to a free and voluntary decision. 
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The only Schneckloth/Blake factor that militates in favor 
of voluntariness is the custodial status of Defendant. He 
was not in custody at the time he consented to the officers' 
seizure. The other factors, however, all point in the 
direction of coercion. First, coercive police procedures 
were used through the repeated and persistent requests by 
the officers for him to open the door. Even after Defendant 
refused to open the door when the officers pretended to be 
drug purchasers, the officers persisted in their attempts to 
get him to open the door. They did not make a request; 
they conveyed a command. Second, the Defendant's extent 
and level of cooperation with police shows that he did not 
eagerly cooperate with the officers. To the contrary, even 
though he ultimately opened the door, he did so holding a 
weapon. Though highly dangerous and, frankly, stupid, 
that conduct hardly constitutes "voluntariness." He wisely 
relented and obeyed the command to drop his weapon, but 
by that point he was already seized-without a warrant. 
Third, no officer testified that they ever conveyed to 
Defendant that he had the right not to open the door, or to 
talk with them only through the door. The officers' 
testimony conceded that they told him instead to "open the 
door" and "come out." 
*5 Applying the appropriate factors to measure the totality 
of circumstances in this case, the only reasonable 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the Government failed 
to show that Defendant freely and voluntarily, without 
coercion or intimidation, opened the door to his motel 
room. The Government thus cannot show that valid 
consent existed as a substitute for a warrant in this case.FN1 
FN1. The remaining Blake factor, the 
Defendant's intelligence and education, is 
essentially neutral given that no related evidence 
was introduced by either party at the hearing. If 
anything, the absence of any indication that 
Defendant lacked intelligence or education to 
understand the choice he purportedly had points 
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in favor of the Government's showing of 
voluntariness. When measured against the other 
factors that strongly point in the opposite 
direction, neither this factor nor the Defendant's 
custodial status is sufficient to overcome the 
presumption of unreasonableness in this case. 
Support for Defendant's position, and the Court's findings, 
is plentiful. The facts here are most analogous to an 
oft-cited Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. 
Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir.1986). In 
Edmondson, the Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant's 
consent to officers' warrantless entry into his residence 
was prompted by a show of official authority rather than 
uncoerced consent. Several F.B.I, agents went to a 
suspect's door, with weapons drawn, identified themselves 
as agents, and then ordered the suspect to open the door. 
The suspect responded by opening the door, stepping back 
into his house with his hands on his head, following which 
the officers entered the residence and arrested the suspect. 
The district court found, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, 
that the suspect's decision to open the door was 
acquiescence to lawful authority even though "[t]here is no 
direct evidence that defendant actually saw officers' drawn 
weapons. However, the defendant was aware there were 
F.B.I, agents at his door and at the bottom of the stairs. 
The presence of a number of officers tends to suggest an 
undertaking that is not entirely dependent on the consent 
and cooperation of the suspect."M at 1515.The critical 
dispositive fact in Edmondson was the particular nature of 
the officers' command to the suspect. The agents did not 
ask for the suspect's cooperation, did not simply ask for a 
chance to talk, and did not confer any indication to the 
suspect that he was free to ignore their request. Instead, 
the officers' command was unequivocal-"F.B.I. agents, 
open the door!" 
This record evidences the same type of situation. 
Following their unsuccessful ruse to get the suspect to 
open the door to sell the officers narcotics, the officers did 
not walk away. They did not call his room to ask him if he 
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wanted to cooperate in their investigation. They did not 
simply knock on the door in the normal course and merely 
request that he open the door to speak with them. They 
instead instructed him to do so after identifying themselves 
as officers. The Defendant may have been able to see the 
officer's identification through the peep hole, together with 
his vest and his undrawn weapon. But even if Defendant 
did not do so, the other facts in this record show the 
Defendant's submission to the officers' authority rather 
than "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice."United States v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F.3d 1529, 1535 
(1 lth Cir. 1995). As a result, the consent exception to the 
warrant requirement cannot apply. 
*6 Tovar-Rico is indeed another analogous case where the 
Eleventh Circuit agreed that the Government had not 
satisfied its burden of showing voluntary consent. In that 
case, officers also went to the home of a suspect and began 
to knock loudly at the door. The officers identified 
themselves through the closed door and instructed the 
person inside to open the door. As soon as the door was 
opened the officers rushed inside with weapons drawn and 
conducted a protective sweep from which incriminating 
evidence was observed. The district court suppressed that 
evidence, however, based on the absence of a warrant and 
the failure of the Government to show that the defendant 
did not open the door simply in response to a show of 
official authority. Id. at 1535-36. 
An older Fifth Circuit case, binding in this Circuit, is also 
instructive. See United States v. Pekar, 315 F.2d 319 (5th 
Cir. 1963). F.B.I, agents investigating the theft of luggage 
knocked on a suspect's hotel room door and stated that 
they wanted to speak with him regarding their 
investigation. The occupant did not answer or open the 
door. The agents waited and tried again. The suspect 
ultimately opened the door when the officers convinced 
him that they were indeed F.B.I, agents. At that point, the 
officers entered the room and saw incriminating evidence. 
Though the district court denied the motion to suppress 
that evidence, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's 
decision to open the door was not voluntary. Id. at 
325.Though the suspect clearly did not want the agents to 
enter when asked, the agents persisted and continued 
knocking on the door. The Court of Appeals found that the 
decision to open the door was merely a response to an 
"aura of officialdom." Id. 
The same is true here. Defendant clearly evidenced his 
intent not to open the door, initially to the purported drug 
buyers and then to the officers who identified themselves 
and directed that he open the door. Defendant only 
acquiesced to those instructions after repeated attempts 
and in response to the officers' authority, not pursuant to 
voluntary consent that was a product of unconstrained 
choice. 
Cases outside this Circuit also support this application of 
the law to similar facts. For instance, in United States v. 
Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222, 1224-1226 (10th Cir.2003), 
officers who suspected the defendant was selling liquor 
illegally knocked on the door of defendant's home at night 
to inquire if they could purchase alcohol. After the officers 
were offered wine through a hole in the wall of the home, 
officers responded by telling the defendant in a firm tone 
of voice, "Tulsa Police Department, open the door.'The 
Court concluded that "a reasonable person, confronted by 
police officers outside his door at night and a command by 
one of the officers to allow them to enter, would have 
believed that he had to open the door of his home and 
submit to the show of authority.'The Court thus held that 
"Flowers' decision to open his door was not voluntary and 
he was [unlawfully] arrested while in his home."M at 
1226 n. 2. 
*7 Similarly, in a different case the Seventh Circuit held 
that when officers knocked on a motel room door for three 
minutes, identified themselves as officers, asked the 
occupants to open the door, knocked on the window for 
one-and-a-half to two minutes, and shined a flashlight into 
the window, the subsequent opening of the door by the 
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defendant was a submission to a show of authority and a 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 691-93 (7th 
Cir.1997). The Court concluded: 
The three minutes of silence by Room 161's occupants, 
when combined with the other circumstances of this 
case, especially the lateness of the hour, amounted to a 
refusal by Mr. Jerez and Mr. Solis to answer the door. 
Once the officers had been refused admittance, their 
continued efforts to rouse the occupants out of bed 
certainly prevented them from ignoring the continued 
requests and from maintaining the privacy and solitude 
of their dwelling. 
Id at 691-92 (footnote omitted). 
A recent case from the Fourth Circuit also supports the 
Court's conclusion here. In United States v. Mowatt, 513 
F.3d 395 (4th Cir.2008), the Court reversed a narcotics 
and weapons conviction based in part on an unlawful entry 
into a defendant's residence. Three police officers were 
dispatched to investigate a report from a private security 
guard that loud music and the smell of marijuana were 
emanating from a tenth-floor apartment in a high-crime 
area. Once on the building's tenth floor, the officers 
identified the apartment and knocked on the apartment's 
closed door. Hearing no response, they began pounding on 
the door, at which time they heard some movement and 
noise inside. Someone then asked who was there, to which 
the officers responded, "It's the police. Open the door. We 
need to investigate something.'The occupants did not 
open the door. But after "there was some back and forth" 
between the person inside and the officers, and repeated 
demands from the officers to open the door, the defendant 
finally opened the door. Id. at 397-98.The officers forced 
their way into the apartment after suspecting that the 
occupant was holding a weapon. They then conducted a 
protective sweep during which incriminating evidence was 
observed. The Court of Appeals held that an unlawful 
search and seizure took place when the officers 
commanded the occupants to open the door. Id. at 400.The 
Court also held that no exigent circumstances existed to 
justify the forced entry into the apartment and, thus, the 
evidence gathered from that unlawful entry had to be 
suppressed. 
The Fourth Circuit found support in part for its conclusion 
from an analogous Eighth Circuit case. See United States 
v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir.1997) (holding 
when four officers knocked on the defendants' motel door 
three times, identified themselves as police, and demanded 
the defendant "open up," the defendants did not 
voluntarily consent to the entry). 
*8 The Fourth Circuit's agreement that facts very similar 
to those in Edmondson, as well as to those here, require 
suppression of evidence is quite telling. There is no 
material dispute among the Circuits that officers' 
commands, directives, or orders to an occupant of a 
dwelling to "open the door" can constitute a "seizure" 
together with all other circumstances. That is based on a 
well-established principle that an unconstitutional search 
occurs when officers gain visual or physical access to a 
motel room after an occupant opens the door involuntarily, 
not consensually, in response to a demand under color of 
authority. United States v. Conner, 127F.3dat663 (citing 
United States v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F.3d at \535-36;United 
States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d at 692\UnitedStates v. Winsor, 
846 F.2d 1569, 1572 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc)). 
That is not to say, of course, that an officer's use of any 
particular words is determinative. The appropriate analysis 
still requires an examination of all the facts in their 
totality. Nevertheless the particular words chosen by the 
officers in context sheds significant light on whether a 
reasonable person in the occupant's position would 
understand the officer's statement as a request to speak 
with him, or instead as a command that he must speak with 
him and must open the threshold of the dwelling to the 
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officer. 
In this case, the officer's language was a directive, not a 
request. The method in which he communicated that 
directive was firm and definite, leaving little room for 
interpretation. And the purpose was clear; the officers 
intended all along to get the occupant to open that door. 
That is why a whole team was assembled that afternoon. 
As one of the officers acknowledged at the hearing: 
Q: So if you're facing the door, he was standing to the left 
and you guys were standing to the right if you're facing 
the door? 
A: Correct. 
Q: From the outside. 
A: Correct. 
Q: And so once he got the door open, you guys would all 
be able to run into the room? 
A: Correct. 
Hearing Trans. 63:24-64:7. 
There can of course be circumstances where an encounter 
with a motel occupant would not rise to the level of 
coerced consent. The Eleventh Circuit has found there to 
be valid consent when officers act in a manner that allows 
a defendant to make an unfettered decision, free from a 
show of official authority. For instance, in United States 
v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1493,1498 (11th Cir.1985), the 
officer telephoned the defendant's motel room, identified 
himself as a police officer, and stated that he would like to 
speak to the defendant face to face, to which the defendant 
responded "okay." The officers then knocked on the 
defendant's room, and he answered the door and said 
"come in." The officer's actions in that situation are in 
stark contrast to those of the Homestead Police in the 
instant case. The Willis officers did not line up outside his 
door in the ready position, and did not order him to "open 
the door" under the color of their authority after having 
previously been told to "go away." Unlike the facts in this 
case, those officers had not arisen the occupant's 
suspicions through a purported drug buy, which resulted 
in a blanket statement that the unknown persons "go 
away," followed by the officers' identifying themselves, 
repeatedly knocking on the door, and ordering Defendant 
to open the door. The record here shows that Defendant 
obeyed an imperative order to open his door and 
acquiesced to the authority of the Homestead Police. 
*9 The Government's position relies primarily upon the 
case of Tobin v. United States, 923 F.2d 1506 (11th 
Cir. 1991), a case that distinguished Edmondson and 
followed Willis. A close reading of Tobin shows, however, 
that what the Eleventh Circuit found absent in that case-an 
officer's use of imperative or directive language-is 
precisely present here. The Court in Tobin actually held 
that there was probable cause and exigent circumstances 
to enter a residence before officers ever knocked on the 
door Jd. at 1510-11 .That itself distinguishes that case from 
this one. 
As an alternative analysis, the Court proceeded to consider 
whether the occupant of a residence voluntarily opened the 
front door to the officers. The Court acknowledged that 
"[i]f the circumstances indicate that [the occupant] opened 
the door in response to a "show of official authority," then 
[he] cannot be deemed to have consented to the agent's 
obtaining the olfactory evidence indicating the presence of 
marijuana. Edmondson, 791 F.2dat 1515."W. at 1512The 
Court found, however, that the circumstances in that case 
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were not like those in Edmondson because "[i]n calling 
out to the occupants of the house, the agent did not use the 
imperative as did the officer in Edmondson.On the 
contrary, he phrased his words in the form of a request. 
The occupants were free to deny that request or 
alternatively talk to the agent through the closed door. The 
decision to open the door was therefore voluntary."M 
This case, like the case that the Eleventh Circuit decided 
four years after Tobin, United States v. Tovar-Rico, 61 
F.3d at 1535, involves clearly imperative language. As 
discussed earlier, Tovar-Rico held that voluntary consent 
was lacking when officers went to the home of a suspect, 
began to knock loudly at the door, identified themselves 
through the closed door as officers, and instructed the 
person inside to open the door. The same circumstances 
occurred here. Based on the testimony of the officers at 
the evidentiary hearing, the Court finds that there was no 
"request" to talk with the officers; instead, the officers 
directed that the occupant "come out" and "open the 
door." This finding clearly distinguishes the facts here 
from Tobin, and falls within the scope of the decisions in 
Edmondson and Tovar-Rico. 
The Government also tried to suggest at the hearing that 
there was a conflict between the testimony of Detective 
Rivera and Detective Hosch. The Government maintained 
that Detective Rivera never expressed any command or 
directive for the occupant to open the door. Rather, the 
Government argued, he simply requested to speak with the 
Defendant. That stood in stark contrast to Detective 
Hosch's testimony, which clearly supported the 
Defendant's argument that he was ordered to open the 
door. Detective Hosch said that the officers repeatedly 
told the Defendant to "open the door." The Government 
thus concludes in its supplemental memorandum that the 
facts here fall more in line with Tobin. 
*10 The Court finds, however, that the officers' testimony 
is easily reconciled. Detective Rivera clearly testified that 
he told the Defendant to "come out." The manner in which 
Detective Rivera testified on the stand and described how 
he told the Defendant to come out evidenced an 
imperative, not a request. His testimony was thus not 
materially different from Detective Hosch's. To the extent 
it was, however, the Court finds that Detective Hosch's 
testimony was more credible, and less equivocating. 
Detective Hosch, the team leader of the operation who 
stood right behind Detective Rivera, testified that he 
clearly heard what Detective Rivera said. He testified that 
the Defendant was instructed to "open the door." Despite 
repeated questioning, Detective Hosch never altered that 
testimony. The Court thus predicates its finding that the 
officers ordered the Defendant to open the door based on 
that testimony. 
Again, however, we do not conclude that Detective Rivera 
was testifying materially differently. He tried to minimize 
how sternly he gave the instruction. But his testimony as 
a whole is fully consistent with the Court's finding that the 
instructions the officers gave Defendant were in the form 
of an imperative command, not an inquisitive request. 
Moreover, the argument that the facts here are like Tobin's 
ignores the reality of the situation. The officers in Tobin 
were not sent on a specific mission to get the Defendant to 
open the door. They were, instead, conducting 
surveillance of a residence. Only after they observed 
incriminating activity did they conclude that they wanted 
to speak to the residents. Then as they approached, and 
before they ever knocked on the door, they smelled 
marijuana emanating from the house. As the Eleventh 
Circuit found, the officers had probable cause at that 
moment to enter the residence. The fact that they tried to 
conduct a "knock and talk" before doing so was just an 
additional basis for the Court to hold that no Fourth 
Amendment violation had occurred. 
Here, however, the officers testified that their purpose was 
to obtain entry into the motel room. Though they had 
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every right to conduct a "knock and talk" operation, that 
is not what they did. The instead tried a different 
approach-a ruse to get the Defendant to open the door to 
sell them drugs, at which point they would rush in and 
arrest him. The ruse did not work and the Defendant told 
them to go away. Having raised the Defendant's 
suspicions, the Defendant did not open the door when they 
identified themselves as Homestead police officers. Only 
after several commands that he "open the door" did the 
Defendant open the door slightly, with gun in hand. 
Perhaps the Defendant was concerned that the persons 
outside the motel room door were not officers, but instead 
other drug merchants looking to rob him. Regardless, his 
conduct did not evidence a voluntary decision to open that 
door. It instead evidenced a submission to the officers' 
imperative instructions. 
*11 Finally, the Court of course does not excuse what 
Defendant did that afternoon. Yet we must also 
acknowledge that the officers in this case breached an 
important constitutional line. Without a warrant issued by 
a dispassionate magistrate judge, the officers forcibly 
coerced a person to open a door to his dwelling under 
color of law. That requires the Court to suppress the 
evidence that was immediately gathered as a result of that 
warrantless entry, no matter how minimal that entry was. 
As Justice Scalia puts it, "any physical invasion of the 
structure of the home 'by even a fraction of an inch,' was 
too much ... and there is certainly no exception to the 
warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks 
open the front door and sees nothing but the nonintimate 
rug on the vestibule floor. In the home, our cases show, all 
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held 
safe from prying government eyes."A^y//o v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 
365 U.S. 505, 512, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)). 
Therefore, consent cannot be used as a substitute for a 
warrant in this case. The Government had a heavy burden 
to show that a warrant was not necessary. The Government 
failed to meet that burden because the opening of the door 
was not an unequivocal, intentional, and uncontaminated 
act free of coercion. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 
A91\Floridav. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. The officers here 
conducted an unconstitutional search and seizure by 
gaining visual and physical access to the motel room 
through the occupant's response to a demand under color 
of authority. See, e.g., United States v. Edmondson, 791 
F.2d at \5\5\United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d at 
397-98',UnitedStates v. Flowers, 336F.3dat \226\United 
States v. Conner, 127 F.3d at 665-66\United States v. 
Jerez, 108 F.3d at 692. 
We note here that no other exception to the warrant 
requirement applies in this case. The Government did not 
argue in its supplemental memorandum, to its credit, that 
any exigent circumstances were present prior to 
Defendant's opening of the door.FN2We are, hence, left 
with a situation where the officers created the exigency by 
coercing the Defendant to open the door. It is well settled 
that valid exigent circumstances do not exist where the 
officers themselves create the exigency. See, e.g., United 
States v. Santa, 236 F.3d at 669-70. The tainted 
evidence-the gun, the drugs, and the statements-must be 
suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.™3 
FN2. Indeed, the Government never even argued 
that probable cause existed with which it could 
obtain a warrant to begin with. The Government 
always argued that the officers' actions were 
warranted only based upon Defendant's voluntary 
opening of the door. Defendant, ironically, 
conceded at the hearing that probable cause did 
exist to obtain a warrant solely based upon the 
tip the officers obtained. The Court, like the 
Government, is not so sure. Regardless, however, 
the Defendant's concession is inconsequential 
because both the Defendant and the Government 
agree that exigent circumstances could not be 
shown without Defendant consensually opening 
the motel room door. 
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FN3. The Government, again to its credit, has 
not argued that even if the officers' entry was 
unlawful the evidence or the statements should 
not be suppressed because intervening 
circumstances dissipated the taint. Undoubtedly 
the circumstances in this case do not allow for 
such an argument because the factors required to 
find attenuation cannot be found here. See Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The illegal entry here 
quickly led to the seizure of the evidence and the 
incriminating statements. There was no sufficient 
lapse between the illegality and the acquisition of 
the evidence to ignore the illegal entry by not 
suppressing the evidence. 
*12 DONE AND SUBMITTED in Chambers at Miami, 
Florida, this 9th day of September, 2008. 
S.D.Fla.,2008. 
U.S. v. Arrington 
Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4459378 (S.D.Fla.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
///. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED 
that Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements and 
Physical Evidence [D.E. 24] be GRANTED. 
Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties have 
Jive (5) business days (until September 16,2008) to serve 
and file written objections, if any, with the Honorable 
Federico A. Moreno, United States District Judge. The 
Court is expediting any objections to this Report and 
Recommendation based upon the imminent trial date and 
pursuant to S.D. Fla. Local Mag.J. R. 4(a). Failure to 
timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo 
determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in 
the report and bar the parties from attacking on appeal the 
factual findings contained herein. R.T.C. v. Hallmark 
Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir.1993); 
LoContev. Dugger, 847F.2d745 (1 \thCir.\98S); Nettles 
v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) 
(en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 
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Background: Defendant was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the District of Kansas of 
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 
and he appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jerome A. Holmes, 
Circuit Judge, held that: 
(1) purported inconsistencies in police officer's testimony 
did not support conclusion that district court clearly erred 
in finding officer's testimony credible; 
(2) district court did not clearly err in finding defendant's 
consent to a search to be voluntary; and 
(3) court did not clearly err in finding that officer did not 
exceed the scope of defendant's consent to search. 
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*956 D. Blair Watson, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Brent I. 
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John K. Henderson, Jr., Office of the Federal Public 
Defender District of Kansas, Wichita, KS, for 
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Before O'BRIEN, HOLLO WAY, and HOLMES, Circuit 
Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
FN* This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of 
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 
consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. 
R. 32.1. 
JEROME A. HOLMES, Circuit Judge. 
**1 Defendant-Appellant Anthony R. Romero was 
convicted by a jury of three counts of possession with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and sentenced to 160 months in 
prison. Mr. Romero appeals the district court's denial of 
his motion to suppress evidence related to the third 
count-specifically, the cocaine found during an April 10, 
2005 police search of a closet containing Mr. Romero's 
personal belongings. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
At approximately 2:00 A.M. on April 10, 2005, Wichita, 
Kansas police officers responded to a call from a neighbor 
reporting a domestic disturbance at 1802 South Madison. 
Sergeant Espinoza was one of at least five officers who 
responded to the domestic disturbance call. Sgt. Espinoza 
was standing outside the residence when he saw Mr. 
Romero, a Hispanic male, running southbound on an 
adjoining street. Sgt. Espinoza followed Mr. Romero and 
found him hiding in bushes. Drawing his gun, Sgt. 
Espinoza ordered Mr. Romero out of the bushes, patted 
him down, and instructed him to sit on the curb. 
Although Sgt. Espinoza was able to converse with Mr. 
Romero, he testified at the suppression hearing that Mr. 
Romero's English was not very good and he had 
experienced some difficulty communicating with him. Sgt. 
Espinoza called for a Spanish-speaking officer to come to 
the residence due to the possibility that the residents of the 
house did not speak English well and to make sure he was 
"covering all the bases." Moreover, Sgt. Espinoza testified 
that Mr. Romero did not smell of alcohol and his 
demeanor and actions did not indicate that he had been 
drinking. 
Mr. Romero falsely identified himself as "Jose Gonzales." 
He told Sgt. Espinoza that he and his brother had been 
involved in a bar fight and that he was running from 
people who had injured his brother. Mr. Romero claimed 
that his brother was at a nearby residence, but he could not 
remember which house. Sgt. Espinoza called dispatch to 
verify this account and was informed that no disturbance 
had been reported from any bar in the area. At this time, 
Officers Boone and Shelton arrived on the scene and 
stayed with Mr. Romero while Sgt. Espinoza returned to 
the residence, where no one had yet gained access to the 
house. After several other officers knocked on the door 
and windows of the residence, Ms. Michelle Montoya 
eventually answered and let the officers into the residence. 
The officers quickly checked the residence and determined 
that Ms. Montoya and three children were the only ones 
present in the residence. 
Meanwhile two blocks away, Officer Boone asked Mr. 
Romero for his name and *958 date of birth. Mr. Romero 
responded that his name was "Jose Gonzales" and that he 
was born April 27, 1978. Officer Boone also asked Mr. 
Romero if he had ever been in jail and Mr. Romero 
answered affirmatively. Officer Boone ran the name "Jose 
Gonzales" through the SPIDER identification database to 
check if there were any outstanding warrants. However, 
the database did not locate any individual by that name. At 
the suppression hearing, Officer Boone testified that he 
asked Mr. Romero his name at least three times during this 
encounter, and all three times, Mr. Romero identified 
himself as "Jose Gonzales." Mr. Romero also told Officer 
Boone the same account of how his brother was injured 
and that his brother was in a nearby house. 
**2 Sgt. Espinoza radioed Officer Boone requesting him 
to ask Mr. Romero if he was willing to come to the 
residence at the 1800 block of Madison. Officer Boone 
drove Mr. Romero approximately two blocks to the 
residence. Mr. Romero rode in the back of the patrol car, 
but Officer Boone did not handcuff him. At the residence, 
the officers continued their attempts to ascertain Mr. 
Romero's identity. After being informed that he could face 
charges for giving the officers a false name, Mr. Romero 
identified himself as "Victor Gonzales" and stated that his 
date of birth was July 7, 1978. 
At Sgt. Espinoza's request, Ms. Montoya agreed to come 
out of the house to see if she could identify Mr. Romero. 
Ms. Montoya identified Mr. Romero as her boyfriend, 
Anthony Romero. Sgt. Espinoza was familiar with the 
name "Anthony Romero" from his previous work in the 
Narcotics Division, and consequently, suspected Mr. 
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Romero of dealing drugs. However, Mr. Romero 
steadfastly maintained that his name was "Victor 
Gonzales," and not "Anthony Romero." The officers ran 
the name "Anthony Romero" in the SPIDER database and 
determined that there were two outstanding felony arrest 
warrants. Upon learning of the outstanding warrants, the 
officers handcuffed Mr. Romero in the back of the patrol 
car. When Mr. Romero still insisted he was not "Anthony 
Romero," the officers asked him whether he had any 
identification inside the residence. Mr. Romero claimed 
that he thought he might have something inside the house 
proving that he was, in fact, "Victor Gonzales." 
Inside the residence, Sgt Espinoza informed Ms, Montoya 
that he suspected Mr. Romero of having drugs in the 
house and asked for her permission to search the house. 
Ms. Montoya agreed, but expressly stated that Mr. 
Romero kept his belongings in a closet and that the 
officers would have to get Mr. Romero's permission to 
search that area. Sgt. Espinoza returned outside and told 
Mr. Romero that they needed to establish his identity and 
requested permission to search his belongings in the closet 
for identification. According to the officers, Mr. Romero 
agreed to the search. Although Sgt. Espinoza wanted to 
search for drugs in addition to the identification, he did 
not inform Mr. Romero of his suspicions regarding drug 
activity. 
After obtaining Mr. Romero's oral consent, Sgt. Espinoza 
began searching Mr. Romero's closet which was located in 
a hallway between two bedrooms. Inside the closet, there 
were some clothes on hangers and some clothes folded on 
shelves. Beginning with the top shelf, Sgt Espinoza began 
lifting up the folded shirts, looking underneath, and feeling 
any pockets to see if they contained identification. *959 In 
between the folded clothes, Sgt. Espinoza discovered a 
white, non-transparent, "Wal-Mart type" shopping bag. 
Opening the shopping bag, Sgt. Espinoza saw a clear 
plastic bag containing what appeared to be rocks of 
crack-cocaine. After finding the bag, Sgt. Espinoza 
continued to search the closet for identification. He found 
various items including a police citation issued to 
"Anthony Romero" and pay stubs bearing the same name. 
**3 On May 3, 2005, Mr. Romero was charged with one 
count of unlawfully possessing, with intent to distribute, 
fifty grams or more of a mixture containing detectable 
amounts of cocaine base.™ Mr. Romero filed a motion to 
suppress the cocaine, arguing that the police officers 
unlawfully searched the closet. On September 22, 2005, 
the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. 
Romero's Motion to Suppress. Sgt. Espinoza, Officer 
Boone, and another officer who responded to the domestic 
disturbance call, Officer Izzard, testified at the hearing. 
Mr. Romero and Ms. Montoya also testified. 
FN1. On September 21, 2005 in a superseding 
indictment, Mr. Romero was charged with three 
counts: (1) possession with intent to distribute 
427 grams of marijuana on December 12, 2003; 
(2) possession with intent to distribute 5,235 
grams of marijuana on June 17, 2004; and (3) 
possession with intent to distribute 50 grams of 
cocaine base on April 10, 2005. This appeal is 
limited to reviewing the district court's denial of 
Mr. Romero's motion to suppress evidence 
related to Count 3. 
Following the district court's denial of Mr. Romero's 
Motion to Suppress, Mr. Romero stood trial. On 
December 9, 2005, the jury found Mr. Romero guilty on 
all three counts. The district court sentenced Mr. Romero 
to a term of 160 months in prison. Mr. Romero timely 
filed this appeal. 
II. DISCUSSION 
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In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we consider 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government 
(as the prevailing party) and accept the district court's 
factual findings unless clearly erroneous. United States v. 
Trotter, 483 F.3d 694, 698 (10th Cir.2007). A finding is 
clearly erroneous when it is "without factual support in the 
record or we are left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made." United States v. Cernobyl, 
255 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotations 
omitted). The ultimate question of the reasonableness of 
a search, however, is reviewed de novo. Trotter, 483 F.3d 
at 698. 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.. .."U.S. 
Const, amend. IV. Indeed, "physical entry into the home 
is the chief evil against which the ... Fourth Amendment is 
directed." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 
S.Ct. 2091,80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (quoting United States 
v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mick, 407 U.S. 297, 
313,92 S.Ct. 2125,32L.Ed.2d752 (1972)). Accordingly, 
warrantless searches and seizures conducted inside a home 
are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); 
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98, 78 S.Ct. 
1253,2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958).™ Nevertheless, the Fourth 
Amendment allows the warrantless search of a home when 
law enforcement officials obtain the voluntary consent of 
an individual with *960 actual or apparent authority. 
Georgiav. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109,126 S.Ct. 1515, 
164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) 
and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 
S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). 
FN2. As Justice Jackson cogently explained, the 
rationale underlying the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement of a warrant is that the determination 
as to "[w]hen the right of privacy must 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
Page 5 
an.))) 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a 
rule, to be decided by a [neutral and detached] 
judicial officer, not by a policeman or 
Government enforcement agent." Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 
92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). 
On appeal, Mr. Romero claims that he did not consent to 
the search of the closet. Additionally, Mr. Romero 
contends that any consent given was involuntary because: 
(1) he was in police custody and handcuffed in the back of 
a patrol car at the time of his alleged consent; (2) he had 
been drinking heavily prior to the incident; and (3) he was 
deceived by the police officer who told him they were 
looking for identification and failed to inform him of the 
real purpose of the search, i.e., to look for drugs. Finally, 
Mr. Romero argues that the officer exceeded the scope of 
his alleged consent to search for identification by opening 
an opaque shopping bag in which the cocaine was 
ultimately found. Each of these arguments lacks merit. 
A. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding 
that Mr. Romero Gave the Officers Consent to Search. 
**4 [1] After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court found that Mr. Romero "unequivocally" gave Sgt. 
Espinoza consent to search the closet. R. Vol. I, Doc. 25 
at 6-7. Notwithstanding Mr. Romero's claim at the 
suppression hearing that he never gave the officers 
permission to search for identification, the district court 
found that during his August 2, 2005 interrogation by 
police, Mr. Romero stated that he could not remember 
whether he gave officers permission to search. 
Accordingly, the district court found that Sgt. Espinoza's 
testimony was more credible than that of Mr. Romero on 
the issue of consent. 
The government bears the burden of proving, by a 
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preponderance of the evidence, that unequivocal and 
specific consent was obtained. United States v. Guerrero, 
All F.3d 784, 789 (10th Cir.2007) (requiring "clear and 
positive testimony that consent was unequivocal and 
specific"). u[T]he credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight to be given the evidence, together with the 
inferences, deductions and conclusions to be drawn from 
the evidence, are all matters most appropriate for 
resolution by the district court." Id. (internal quotations 
omitted). Accord United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 
1513 (10th Cir.1990) ("Assessment of the credibility of 
witnesses is the prerogative of the trial court, not an 
appellate court, which neither sees nor hears the 
witnesses.") Accordingly, determinations of witness 
credibility will not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
erroneous. "This holds particularly true where, as here, the 
credibility of witnesses is important on the issue of 
voluntariness [of consent to search]." Guerrero, All F.3d 
at 789 (internal quotations omitted). 
Mr. Romero argues that the district court's credibility 
determination regarding Sgt. Espinoza is clearly erroneous 
because "[o]n two occasions, he was untruthful to the 
Court." Aplt. Opening Br. at 9. We disagree. 
In the first cited instance, which occurred during the 
suppression hearing, *961 Sgt. Espinoza testified on direct 
examination that he found the cocaine in a clear bag 
between folded clothes in the closet. Contrary to Mr. 
Romero's assertions, Sgt. Espinoza did not testify that the 
cocaine was in plain view as he sorted through the folded 
clothing. Subsequently, in response to more detailed 
questioning on cross-examination, Sgt. Espinoza clarified 
that the clear bag of cocaine was inside a white, opaque 
"Wal-Marttype" shopping bag. Such a clarification hardly 
impugns Sgt. Espinoza's credibility. We discern nothing in 
this example that would lead us to conclude that the 
district court's credibility determination is clearly 
erroneous. 
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In the second instance, Mr. Romero asserts that Sgt. 
Espinoza contradicted himself regarding the need for an 
interpreter. At the suppression hearing, Sgt. Espinoza 
testified that he had some difficulty communicating with 
Mr. Romero because Mr. Romero did not speak English 
well. Two months later at Mr. Romero's trial, Sgt. 
Espinoza testified that he did not recall having difficulty 
communicating with Mr. Romero. 
**5 After reviewing the transcript of the suppression 
hearing, however, Sgt. Espinoza conceded that initially he 
did have some difficulty communicating with Mr. Romero. 
Yet, Sgt. Espinoza consistently maintained that he called 
the Spanish-language interpreter to the residence in order 
to communicate with the individuals inside the house, not 
Mr. Romero. These purported "inconsistencies" in Sgt. 
Espinoza's testimony do not support a conclusion that the 
district court clearly erred in finding his testimony to be 
credible. 
In sum, insofar as it rests on Sgt. Espinoza's alleged lack 
of veracity, Mr. Romero's challenge to the district court's 
credibility finding is wholly without merit. See United 
States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th 
Cir.2006) (seeing "no reason not to defer to the court's 
credibility determination" where district court credits law 
enforcement officer's testimony over that of defendant 
(emphasis added)), cert, denied,— U.S. -—, 127 S.Ct. 
1027, 166 L.Ed.2d 773 (2007).™ 
FN3. Mr. Romero suggests that it would defy 
logic to believe that he would have granted 
consent under the circumstances: "[t]here is no 
logical reason to believe that he would [consent] 
if [the closet] contained cocaine." Aplt. Opening 
Br. at 15. However, the case law is replete with 
examples of individuals consenting to a search 
that later reveals evidence of contraband, 
attesting to the fact that people do not always 
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behave logically. See, e.g., United States v. 
Sawyer, 441 F.3d 890, 892 (10th Cir.2006) 
(consensual search of defendant's business 
revealed stolen motorcycle engines), cert, 
denied,-' U.S. — , 127 S.Ct. 156, 166 L.Ed.2d 
39 (2006); United States v. Rosborough, 366 
F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir.2004) (consensual 
search of defendant's vehicle revealed 30 pounds 
of cocaine). 
Finally, Mr. Romero argues, for the first time on appeal, 
that the failure to provide a consent-to-search form 
supports giving him the benefit of the doubt that he did 
not, in fact, consent, unless there is some justification for 
why the consent was not documented. As support, Mr. 
Romero argues that "[a]s a matter of policy, law 
enforcement should be held to a higher burden of 
verification or documentation when obtaining consent to 
search a home." Aplt. Opening Br. at 15. Mr. Romero 
cites no authority to undergird this proposition, however. 
Generally, absent plain error resulting in manifest 
injustice, we will not consider issues that are raised for the 
first time on appeal. See United States v. Goode, 483 F.3d 
676, 681 (10th Cir,2007); United States v. On, 864 F.2d 
1505, 1508-09 (10th Cir.1988). Any error here is hardly 
plain. 
Consent is a factual issue to be determined by the totality 
of the circumstances, *962 not by per se rules. In other 
words, no one factor-including the execution of a 
consent-to-search form-is dispositive. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has twice rejected per se rules in determining the 
validity of a consent to search. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) 
(rejecting rule requiring "police officers to always inform 
detainees that they are free to go before a consent to 
search may be deemed voluntary"); Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,227,248-49,93 S.Ct. 2041,36 
L.Ed.2d 854(1973) (rejecting rule requiring individuals to 
be informed of their right to refuse consent). More 
specifically, citing Robinette, the Eighth Circuit concluded 
that a signed consent-to-search form was not a prerequisite 
for establishing the voluntariness of consent. United States 
v. Carrate, 122 F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir.1997). 
Accordingly, Mr. Romero's newly-spawned contention of 
error regarding the officers' failure to get his written 
consent is not plain, and we therefore will not consider it. 
B. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding 
that Mr. Romero Voluntarily Consented to the Search 
of the Closet. 
**6 [2] Mr. Romero also challenges the district court's 
ruling that he voluntarily consented to the search claiming 
that: (1) he was in custody in handcuffs in the back seat of 
a patrol car; (2) he had been drinking heavily prior to the 
incident; and (3) he was deceived by the police officer 
who told him officers were looking for identification and 
did not mention any suspicion of drug activity.™4 
FN4. On appeal, Mr. Romero does not argue that 
his consent was involuntary because of language 
barriers. Any "communication barrier" Mr. 
Romero refers to involves his allegation that he 
had been drinking heavily. Mr. Romero's 
arguments regarding the need for an interpreter 
all bear on the issue of Sgt. Espinoza's 
credibility. It is only in his reply brief that Mr. 
Romero seems to argue that the language barrier 
provides a basis for finding involuntary consent. 
"Failure to raise an issue in the opening appellate 
brief waives that issue." United States v. Black, 
369 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir.2004). In any 
event, Mr. Romero's contention is unpersuasive. 
The district court specifically noted that 
"[although the defendant may not be completely 
fluent in English, the evidence persuades the 
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court that the defendant understood the request, • the threatening presence of several officers; 
that he was able to communicate his thoughts to 
the officer, and he made a decision of his own 
free will to grant permission to search the closet • the display or brandishing of weapons; 
for his identification." R. Vol. I, Doc. 25 at 7. 
These findings are not clearly erroneous. See 
United States v. Contreras, 372 F.3d 974, • some physical touching by an officer; 
977-78 (8th Cir.2004) (finding that defendant's 
difficulties with English did not prevent him 
from voluntarily consenting to a search of his 
home). 
The government bears the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the individual 
voluntarily consented-"a burden that is not satisfied by 
showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority." 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The government must demonstrate 
that consent was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied. See United States v. Butler, 966 F.2d 559, 562 
(10th Cir. 1992). The question of whether an individual has 
voluntarily consented to a search is a question of fact that 
the district court must evaluate under the totality of the 
circumstances. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 
417; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27, 93 S.Ct. 2041; see 
also Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d at 1265 (observing that 
voluntariness of consent is a question of fact which is 
reviewed under the highly deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard); United States v. Sawyer, 441 F.3d 890., 895 
(10th Cir.2006) (a[T]he federal test for determining*963 
the validity of consent to search requires a factual 
determination based upon the totality of the circumstances 
of whether the consent was the product of an 'essentially 
free and unconstrained choice by [the] maker' or whether 
it was the product of 'duress or coercion, express or 
implied.' ") (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 
S.Ct. 2m\cert. denied,-- U.S. —-, 127 S.Ct. 156, 166 
L.Ed.2d 39 (2006). Factors to consider within the totality 
of circumstances include: 
• use of aggressive language or tone of voice indicating 
that compliance with an officer's request is compulsory; 
• prolonged retention of personal effects such as 
identification, plane or bus tickets; 
• request to accompany officer to the station; 
• interaction in a nonpublic place; 
• absence of other members of the public; 
• the administration of Miranda warnings; 
• use of physical violence; 
• oral threats; 
• promises, inducements, deception, trickery; 
• the physical and mental condition and capacity of they 
defendant; and 
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• whether the police informed defendant of the right to 
refuse consent. 
See Guerrero, 472 F.3d at 790; Sawyer, 441 F.3d at 895; 
United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1500 (10th 
Cir.1996). 
Addressing Mr. Romero's first argument, the fact that Mr. 
Romero was in custody is not dispositive as to the 
voluntariness of his consent. See United States v. Watson, 
423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) 
(u[T]he fact of custody alone has never been enough in 
itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to 
search."). "Consent to search may be voluntary, even 
though the consenting party is being detained at the time 
consent is given." United States v. Doyle, 129 F.3d 1372, 
\377 (\0thCivA997). Accord United States v. Dozal, 173 
F.3d 787, 796 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Soto, 988 
F.2d 1548,1557 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Valid consent may be 
given by a person being detained."). A court must look to 
all the facts and circumstances to determine whether the 
consent to search was freely given by an individual under 
arrest. See United States v. Shields, 573 F.2d 18,23 (10th 
Cir. 1978). 
**7 Applying the factors enumerated above, the district 
court found that although Mr. Romero was in custody at 
the time he gave consent, the totality of the circumstances 
did not warrant a finding that Mr. Romero's consent was 
coerced. Specifically, the court observed that: 
the defendant was on a public street in front of his home 
..., and the officers did not use any overt display offeree 
or coercion to gain the consent. The interaction between 
the officer and the defendant was cordial and courteous 
at the time of the request. And although the officers did 
not inform the defendant that he had a right to refuse a 
search, the manner in which the officer sought consent 
conveyed that he was seeking the defendant's 
permission for a search and that the defendant was not 
obligated to give consent. Moreover, the evidence*964 
shows that the defendant is a competent adult who 
understood the circumstances and the nature of the 
officer's request. 
R. Vol. I, Doc. 25 at 7. In our view, the district court 
properly considered the fact that Mr. Romero was in 
custody along with the rest of the circumstances in 
concluding that Mr. Romero voluntarily consented to the 
search. 
[3] Second, Mr. Romero argues that his heavy drinking 
prior to the incident rendered his consent involuntary. The 
district court found that "despite testimony of the 
defendant and his girlfriend about how much alcohol the 
defendant drank prior to the incident, there is no credible 
evidence that defendant's ability to understand or make a 
voluntary decision was impaired to any significant degree 
by alcohol." R. Vol. I, Doc. 25 at 7. On appeal, Mr. 
Romero fails to show why this conclusion is clearly 
erroneous. 
In United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1985), we 
held that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search 
of his glove box even though his drug intoxication made 
him slur his speech, stagger, sway, and use his vehicle to 
support himself. Id. at 377 (recognizing "different degrees 
of intoxication" where an individual "can be too 
intoxicated to operate a motor vehicle, but rational enough 
to understand requests and to give plausible 
explanations"). In this case, Mr. Romero understood and 
responded to Sgt. Espinoza's and Officer Boone's 
questions and even offered a narrative explaining why he 
was running down the street. Both officers also testified 
that they did not smell alcohol on Mr. Romero's breath and 
that Mr. Romero's actions and demeanor did not indicate 
that he had been drinking. Accordingly, the district court 
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properly weighed the evidence and did not clearly err m 
finding Mr Romero's consent to be voluntary, despite his 
alleged intoxication 
Third, Mr Romero claims that Sgt Espmoza's 
"deception" and "trickery" regarding the object of the 
search rendered his consent invalid Aplt Opening Br at 
16-17 When assessing the voluntariness of consent, the 
use of deception or trickery is one factor to be considered 
m the totality of the circumstances Sawyer 441 F 3d at 
895 However, under the facts present here, this factor is 
of no moment 
**8 Sgt Espmoza truthfully told Mr Romero that he 
wanted to look for proof confirming his identity He 
simply did not go further and tell Mr Romero he also was 
looking for evidence of drug-dealing Even if this 
omission could be construed as evincing deceit, it would 
not be the kmd of deceit that would have the capacity on 
these facts to erode the strong foundation of Mr Romero's 
otherwise voluntary consent See United States v White 
706F 2d 806,807-08 (7th Cir 1983) (holdmg that officer's 
subjective intent to search for money did not render 
involuntary a defendant's consent to search for drugs) Cf 
United States v Kimoana 383 F 3d 1215, 1224 (10th 
Cir 2004) ( "Although the officers executing the search 
were looking for weapons rather than the vehicle key, the 
subjective motivation of the officers executing the search 
is irrelevant")FN5 Accordingly the district court did not 
commit *965 clear error in its determination of 
voluntariness 
FN5 Mr Romero's argument that Sgt Espmoza 
was familiar with an individual by the name of 
"Anthony Romero," and therefore, had no need 
to confirm Mr Romero's identity is belied by the 
fact that Mr Romero steadfastly maintained that 
he was not Anthony Romero Moreover, even 
after finding the drugs, Sgt Espmoza continued 
to look for identification bearing the name 
"Anthony Romero " 
C. The Officers Did Not Exceed the Scope of Mr. 
Romerofs Consent in Opening up the Plastic Shopping 
Bag in the Closet. 
[4] Mr Romero also argues that Sgt Espmoza exceeded 
the scope of any alleged consent when he opened an 
opaque shopping bag found m the closet 
"The scope of a search is generally defined by its 
expressed object" Florida v Jimeno 500 U S 248, 251, 
111 SCt 1801, 114 LEd2d 297 (1991) Accord 
Kimoana 383 F 3d at 1223 Additionally, "the scope of 
the consent determines the permissible scope of the 
search " United States v Marquez 337 F 3d 1203, 1207 
(10th Cir 2003) Accord United States v West 219 F 3d 
1171, 1177 (10th Cir 2000) In determining the scope of 
the consent, courts apply an objective-reasonableness test 
"[W]hat would the typical reasonable person have 
understood by the exchange between the officer and the 
suspect?" Jimeno 500 U S at 251, 111 SCt 1801 
(finding it objectively reasonable for police to conclude 
that general consent to search defendant s car for drugs 
included consent to search paper bag on floor of car which 
might reasonably have contained drugs) Moreover, 
consent to search for specific items includes consent to 
search those areas and containers that might reasonably 
contain those items Id Finally, whether a search remains 
withm the boundaries of consent is a question of fact to be 
determined by the totality of circumstances, and a district 
court's findings will be upheld unless they are clearly 
erroneous See Kimoana 383 F 3d at 1223, West 219 
F 3d at 1177 ("The court determines from the totality of 
the circumstances whether a search remams withm the 
boundaries of the consent, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the government") 
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In this case, a reasonable person would have understood 
the exchange between Sgt. Espinoza and Mr. Romero to 
mean that Mr. Romero was granting permission to search 
anywhere in the closet for identification. The plastic 
shopping bag discovered by Sgt. Espinoza in the closet 
reasonably could have contained a receipt or other 
identifying information. Mr. Romero disputes that one 
could reasonably believe that identifying information 
could be found where Sgt. Espinoza discovered the 
bag-that is, among folded (possibly clean) clothes. But we 
do not share Mr. Romero's doubt. 
**9 Sgt. Espinoza was feeling the pockets of the clothes 
when he found the bag. Clothing pockets reasonably could 
be viewed as possible locations of identifying information. 
Cf Marquez, 337 F.3d at 1208-09 (holding it was 
objectively reasonable for police to conclude that the 
general consent to search defendant's recreational vehicle 
for drugs and guns included consent to search 
compartment under bench seat of vehicle where drugs and 
guns could reasonably have been stored); United States v. 
Tirado, 313 F.3d 437, 440 (8th Cir.2002) (searching 
defendant's bedroom closet and bag hanging in the closet 
was not beyond scope of consent to search where 
defendant did not limit the scope of the search of his 
bedroom); United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139, 
1146-47 (10th Cir.2002) (upholding officer's removal of 
speaker grill covers as not exceeding scope of general 
consent to search car); West, 219 F.3d at 1178 (affirming 
district court's *966 conclusion that consent given by 
defendant to search car for drugs and firearms reasonably 
included consent to search the trunk and the containers 
which could have contained either drugs or firearms). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not 
clearly err in finding that the search was within the scope 
of Mr. Romero's consent. 
III. CONCLUSION 
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We conclude that the district court did not commit clear 
error in finding that Mr. Romero unequivocally and 
voluntarily consented to the search and that the search did 
not exceed the scope of Mr. Romero's consent. Therefore, 
we AFFIRM the district court's judgment. 
C.A.10 (Kan.),2007. 
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